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This thesis applies several Firepower Score attrition algorithms to real data. These
algorithms are used in highly aggregated combat models to predict attrition and
movement rates. The quality of the available historical data for validation of attrition
models is poor. Most accessible battle data contain only starting sizes and casualties,
sometimes only for one side. A detailed database of the Battle of Kursk of World War n,
the largest tank battle in history, has recently been developed by Dupuy Institute (TDI).
The data is two-sided, time phased (daily), highly detailed, and covers 15 days of the
campaign. According to combat engagement intensity, three different data sets are
extracted from the Battle of Kursk data. RAND's Situational Force Scoring, Dupuy'
s
QJM and the ATLAS ground attrition algorithms are applied to these data sets. Fitted
versus actual personnel and weapon losses are analyzed for the different approaches and
data sets. None of the models fits better in all cases. In all of the models and for both
sides, the Fighting Combat Unit Data set gives the best fit. All the models tend to
overestimates battle casualties, particularly for the Germans.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
"War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death; the
road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." Sun Tzu, one of the
most famous military thinkers in history, described war and pointed out the importance of
the studies of war over 1500 years ago in his book The Art of War [Ref. 1].
Since the dawn of history scientists, researchers, and the military have tried to
develop fundamental laws or theories that explain the interactions of military forces in
combat and the outcomes of battles. Combat models are widely used in battle planning,
wartime operations, force sizing, human resource planning, logistics planning, national
policy analysis, and the decision process for the acquisition of weapon systems [Ref. 4:p.
6-7].
Combat models are categorized into two groups according to the level of
representation of the combatants. The first group is high-resolution combat models in
which each combat vehicle or soldier is explicitly represented as an entity. The second
group is low-resolution (aggregated) combat models, which represents battalion and
higher units as an entity. The issue of aggregation has been addressed by many authors
over the years. Many of these studies on attrition methodology include the subjects of
Lanchester's Law, data sources, such as historical vs. engineering vs. empirical, and a
combination of the two which are scoring systems such as Firepower Scores. The primary
focus of this thesis is the validity of the Firepower Score approach to attrition in low-
resolution (aggregated) combat models.
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Attrition is a reduction in the number of personnel, weapons, and equipment in a
military unit, organization, or force [Ref. 3:p. 1]. Combat attrition is one of the most
important aspects of combat modeling. Combat attrition is the only combat process for
which well-developed mathematical theories exist [Ref. 6:p. 4-1]. Even though attrition is
the most studied combat process, there is no agreement on the best way to model it. The
main reason is the lack of real data, which can be used to validate combat attrition
models.
Aggregated attrition process models can be categorized into two basic types that
correspond to the two basic entity aggregation patterns—homogeneous and heterogeneous
[Ref. 6:p. 4-2]. The basic idea of homogenous force ratio attrition models is to aggregate
all the individual combatants in a unit into a scalar measure of the unit's combat power
[Ref. 6:p. 4-3]. The Firepower score approach is used in, aggregated, large-scale, combat
simulations as the primary descriptor of what a combat unit is worth [Ref. 6:p. 2-5]. The
ratio of attacker to defender combat power is used to determine the casualties for both
sides.
The quality of the available historical data for validation of attrition models is
very poor. The most accessible battle data contain only starting sizes and casualties and
sometimes only for one side [Ref. 5:p. 470]. Recently, more data has become available.
Improved database management and computing power have helped in gathering such
data.
Detailed databases on the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle in history, and
the Ardennes Campaign of World War II, have recently been developed. Both data sets
XXV
are two-sided, time-phased (daily) and detailed. Hartley and Helmbod pointed out that
unless we are able to procure time-phased detailed data, we will not be able to validate
any attrition model [Ref. 5:p. 89]. In this thesis, we focus on time-phased, highly detailed,
two-sided data.
Most of the past empirical validation studies have focused on the Lanchester
Equations, which were introduced by the English engineer, Frederick William Lanchester.
These studies include the works of Bracken [Ref. 8] and Flicker [Ref. 9] on the Ardennes
Campaign of World War n, Clemens [Ref. 10] and Turkes [Ref. 11] on the Battle of
Kursk of World War II, and Hartley and Helmbold [Ref. 12] on the Inchon-Seoul
Campaign of the Korean War. These works are among the few quantitative studies that
use daily force size data for real battles.
Besides the Lanchester equations, another approach for combat attrition is models
that use force ratio in their structure. This thesis focuses on aggregate attrition
methodologies that use combat power ratio to compute the casualties of the forces. Unlike
the Lanchester equations, there is no study in the literature that used firepower score
attrition models on real data in which force sizes are available day by day for both sides.
One of the interesting aspects of the Battle of Kursk is the engagement
percentages of the forces. The Germans had a considerably larger portion of their forces
in contact. This suggests that the German force may have been subjected to more fatigue
than the Soviets. With an average of 97 percent of its heavy mechanized force on the
front lines, the Germans, unlike the Soviets, had no reserves to use [Ref. 14:p. 9-4].
Depending on combat engagement intensity, this study extracts three different data sets
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from the data on the Battle of Kursk in the KOSAVE report.
The first data set, all combat units data (ACUD), includes all combat units:
contact, out of contact, active, and inactive, including HQ above division level. The
second data set, contact combat units data (CCUD), includes only combat units those are
in contact with the enemy: units in contact fighting and not fighting, HQ above division
level is excluded [Ref. 14:p. 5-9]. The third data set, fighting combat units data (FCUD),
includes only combat units that are in contact and fighting with the enemy: HQ above
division level are excluded [Ref. 14:p. 5-9].
In this research, three Firepower score models are applied to the three data sets
that are extracted from the data on the Battle of Kursk. The first model is the ATLAS
ground attrition model, which is used in the TACWAR simulation [Ref. 24]. The second
model is RAND's SFS model, which was proposed in 1991 and is used in the JICM
simulation [Ref. 25]. The last model is the simplified QJM model, developed by Trevor
Dupuy. Instead of focusing only on one model and investigating it in detail, the
applicability of the three primary firepower score models to real data is investigated. In
addition, some insight is given about the attrition processes and other factors used in
aggregated combat models.
The key findings from this research include:
• Of all the models looked at, when combat power losses are considered, the
ATLAS model with the air sortie data fits best.
• Generally, the models overestimate the attacker's casualties during the
battle.
• Overall, all of the models fit better for the Germans than the Soviets. In his
study [Ref. 11], Turkes also found that his models fit better for the
Germans.
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In all of the models and for both sides, the FCUD data set gives the best
fit.
One of the difficulties with aggregated combat attrition models that use
force ratio is the need to determine the attacking side. It is always not very
easy to determine the attacking side.
Prior to a battle, it is difficult to determine factors such as intensity and
nationality factors.
One of the problems with traditional force ratio models is that the loss
rates in each weapons category are the same as the combat power casualty
rate. For instance, if the combat casualty rate is 4 percent, then each
weapons category will take 4 percent losses. However, this does not match
either the historical facts or the results from the higher-resolution combat
models. In this thesis, the linear regression analysis is used to determine
how to allocate the combat power casualty rates to the different weapon
groups.
Due to the general overestimation of the German casualties and the
underestimation of the Soviet casualties, anything that improves the force
ratio with respect to the Germans improves the quality of the fits.
Anything that added to German effectiveness or cut Soviet effectiveness
could improve the quality of the fits.
Using different firepower scores, like Bracken's weights, does not give a
better fit except for the Soviet values in the CCUD data set, which is
slightly better. Much more work is needed to find the best firepower
scores, such as optimization of the score values, and sensitivity analysis.
The PLOT movement rate is only computed in the SFS model. The
ATLAS model has also look up tables to compute the movement rates
according to the force ratio, terrain, and combat postures. However, in the
tables, the force ratio threshold is higher than the ones computed for this
battle. The force ratio of the Germans in the ATLAS model is very low.
As a result, it was not possible to compute the FLOT movement rates in
the ATLAS model.
This analysis is based on observational census data of the Battle of Kursk
of World War II, and may not generalize, since it is not a random sample
of a larger population. The outcome of a battle cannot be precisely
determined with the use of combat models. They might provide insights
into future battles between adversaries. Besides being used to gain insight
into the battles, which occurred in the past, they should help in making
better decisions by enabling the decision-maker to compare the different
alternatives by using various combat model techniques [Ref. ll:p 145].
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I. INTRODUCTION
"War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death; the
road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." Sun Tzu, one of the
most famous military thinkers in history, described war and pointed out the importance of
the studies of war over 1500 years ago in his book The Art of War [Ref. 1]. Clausewitz
defined war in his book, On War [Ref. 2], as "War is thus an act of force to compel our
enemy to do our will." Throughout history, war has been a topic of analysis for scientists
and researchers.
A. COMBAT MODELING
An understanding of combat phenomena is facilitated by using a hierarchy of
combat to describe combat events and aggregate them for analysis [Ref. 3:p. 153]. A
commonly accepted hierarchy of combat is as follows: War, already defined, is at the top
of the hierarchy. A campaign is a phase of war involving a series of battles related in time
and space with the aim of achieving a single, specific objective. A battle is combat
between major forces, each having opposing assigned or perceived operational business.
An engagement is combat between two forces from battalion to division level. An action
is combat between squad or battalion level. A duel is combat between two individuals.
Since the dawn of history scientists, researchers, and the military have tried to
develop fundamental laws or theories that explain the interactions of military forces in
combat and the outcomes of battles. Combat models are widely used in battle planning,
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wartime operations, force sizing, human resource planning, logistics planning, natic
policy analysis, and the decision process for the acquisition of weapon systems [Ref. 4
6-7].
In Operation Desert Storm an existing theater-level simulation, Concept
Evaluation Model (CEM), was used by analysts at the US Army Concepts Analysis
Agency (CAA) [Ref. 5:p. 549] to simulate the Desert Storm scenario for assisting in war-
planning and war-fighting efforts. The actual efforts of their studies became clear when a
letter from LTG Reimer to the Director of CAA, Mr. E.B. Vandiver, arrived in February
1991. The letter, in part, stated, "The analytical support you provided for Operation
Desert Shield and Desert Storm has been absolutely outstanding. [It was] used by the
Army Staff, the Joint Staff and our Army in Southwest Asia to prepare for war. The Army
leadership used it for discussion and briefings with key military and civilian leaders,
including the National Command Authority [Ref. 5:p. 559]."
Combat models are categorized into two groups according to the level of
representation of the combatants. The first group is high-resolution combat models in
which each combat vehicle or soldier is explicitly represented as an entity. The second
group is low-resolution (aggregated) combat models, which represents battalion and
higher units as an entity. The issue of aggregation has been addressed by many authors
over the years. Many of these studies on attrition methodology include the subjects of
Lanchester's Law, data sources, such as historical vs. engineering vs. empirical, and a
combination of the two which are scoring systems such as Firepower Scores. The primary
focus of this thesis is the validity of the Firepower Score approach to attrition in low-
resolution (aggregated) combat models.
B. ATTRITION
Attrition is a reduction in the number of personnel, weapons, and equipment in a
military unit, organization, or force [Ref. 3:p. 1). Combat attrition is one of the most
important aspects of combat modeling. Combat attrition is the only combat process for
which well-developed mathematical theories exist [Ref. 6:p. 4-1]. Even though attrition is
the most studied combat process, there is no agreement on the best way to model it. The
main reason is the lack of real data, which can be used to validate combat attrition
models. It is useful to be able to predict combat attrition accurately in order to provide
estimates of requirements for the planning process for medical, logistics and personnel
training [Ref. 3:p. 2].
Aggregated attrition process models can be categorized into two basic types that
correspond to the two basic entity aggregation patterns—homogeneous and heterogeneous
[Ref. 6:p. 4-2]. A heterogeneous aggregated attrition model assesses the amount of
attrition caused by a weapon system class against each enemy weapon system class. Thus,
the interactions between different weapon groups (i.e., who kills who) are implemented in
this type of attrition processes. In a homogenous aggregated attrition process, all of the
weapon groups are aggregated with their weights into the combat power of a single unit.
Most homogeneous attrition models determine the amount of combat power attrition by
computing attacker to defender force ratios [Ref. 6:p 4-2]. The interactions between
different weapon groups are not considered in homogeneous attrition models.
C. FIREPOWER SCORE APPROACH
The basic idea of homogenous force ratio attrition models is to aggregate all the
individual combatants in a unit into a scalar measure of the unit's combat power [Ref.
6:p. 4-3]. The Firepower score approach is used in, aggregated, large-scale, combat
simulations as the primary descriptor of what a combat unit is worth. [Ref. 6:p. 2-5]. The
ratio of attacker to defender combat power is used to determine the casualties for both
sides.
In the Firepower score approach, the combat power of a unit is computed by
summing the combat power value for each weapon system in the unit. In Parry's notes
[Ref. 6:p. 4-5] the combat power computation is given in a simple equation as follows:
Suppose that there are n different types of weapon system in a combat unit and that:
Xi: the number of weapons of type i in the unit [i=l,2,3...n]
Si: the firepower score value representing the combat power for each type i
weapon. Then, the firepower index of the aggregated unit is
FPi^xrs, (i.i)
f-1
Finally, the force ratio is determined as:
FR = FPI(A)/FPI(D) (1.2)
Where:
FPI(A): the firepower index of the attacking forces
FPI(D): the firepower index of the defender.
The force ratio gives a measure of relative combat power in the battle. The force
ratio in many aggregated combat models, such as TACWAR, is used to compute
casualties for both sides in a battle and to determine the FEBA (forward edge of the battle
area) or FLOT (forward line of troops) movement rates.
The method of determining the firepower scores is a very difficult problem. There
are several methods of computing firepower score values, such as military judgement and
experience (RAND's ground force scoring system [Ref. 7]), historical combat
performance derived from WWII and the Korean War, and results from high resolution
simulations (i.g., Anti-Potential-Potential Method) [Ref. 6:p. 2-6].
There is no published validation study in the literature using firepower score
approaches on real data in which force sizes are available day by day for both sides. This
thesis describes how different firepower score approaches fit to the data on the Battle of
Kursk. This data is time-phased, two-sided and very detailed. This study will help
analysts make better decisions and perhaps provide a better understanding of war by
adding to an understanding how combat models fit to real data. The next section presents
the outline of the thesis.
D. THESIS OUTLINE
This thesis consists of five chapters. This first chapter introduces the general
concept of combat modeling and firepower score approaches used in the attrition process
of aggregated combat models. The second chapter gives a brief history of the Battle of
Kursk of World War II and analyzes the battle's data. Three different data sets are
extracted from the data on the Battle of Kursk according to the combat engagement
intensity. These data sets are all combat units data (ACUD), contact combat units data
(CCUD), and fighting combat units data (FCUD).
In the fourth chapter, three force ratio attrition models that use the firepower score
approach are applied to the three data sets described above. Chapter five presents the final
conclusions and recommendations based on the results and also recommends future areas
of study in combat modeling.
II. PREVIOUS VALIDATION STUDIES ON COMBAT
MODELING
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES WITH LANCHESTER EQUATIONS
The quality of the available historical data for validation of attrition models is
very poor. The most accessible battle data contain only starting sizes and casualties and
sometimes only for one side [Ref. 5:p. 470]. Recently, more data has become available.
Improved database management and computing power have helped in gathering such
data.
Detailed databases on the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle in history, and
the Ardennes Campaign of World War n, have recently been developed. Both data sets
are two-sided, time-phased (daily) and detailed. Hartley and Helmbod pointed out that
unless we are able to procure time-phased detailed data, we will not be able to validate
any attrition model [Ref. 5:p. 89]. In this thesis, we focus on time-phased, highly detailed,
two-sided data.
Most of the past empirical validation studies have focused on the Lanchester
Equations, which were introduced by the English engineer, Frederick William Lanchester.
These studies include the works of Bracken [Ref. 8] and Flicker [Ref. 9] on the Ardennes
Campaign of World War n, Clemens [Ref. 10] and Turkes [Ref. 11] on the Battle of
Kursk of World War II, and Hartley and Helmbold [Ref. 12] on the Inchon-Seoul
Campaign of the Korean War. These works are among the few quantitative studies that
use daily force size data for real battles.
In his study [Ref. 8], Bracken found that the Lanchester linear model best fits the
Ardennes campaign data. Flicker [Ref.7] revisited Bracken's modeling of the Ardennes
campaign. In contrast to Bracken, Flicker found that the Lanchester linear and square
laws do not fit the data. He concludes that a new form of the Lanchester equations, with a
physical interpretation closest to Lanchester' s logarithmic law, applies best.
Clemens [Ref. 10] applied the Lanchester Equations to the data on the Battle of
Kursk. Clemens used two estimation techniques: linear regression and Newton-Raphson
iteration. He concludes that neither the Lanchester linear nor the Lanchester square model
fit the data. The Lanchester logarithmic model fits better than the Lanchester linear and
square models.
Hartley and Helmbold's study [Ref. 12] focused on validating the homogeneous
Lanchester square law by using Inchon-Seoul Campaign data. Hartley and Helmbold use
three analysis techniques to examine the data: linear regression, the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and Bozdogan's consistent AIC (CAIC). They find that the data do not fit
a constant coefficient Lanchester square law. They conclude that, by dividing the
campaign into three distinct battles that each battle's data can be fit to a constant
coefficient Lanchester square law, using separate coefficients for each battle.
In his study Turkes [Ref. 11] applies a total of 39 diverse models to the data on
the Battle of Kursk using different approaches. These approaches include applying the
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methodologies of previous studies, using robust LTS (least trimmed squares) regression,
including the air sortie data of the battle, considering the battle in separate phases, fitting
basic Lanchester equations and using different weights [Ref 9]. He concludes that:
• None of the original Lanchester equations applies very well to the data on
the Battle of Kursk. The best fits are implausible.
• The parameters derived from Bracken and Flicker's Ardennes studies do
not apply to the data on the Battle of Kursk. This implies that there are no
unique parameters that apply to all battles.
• The Robust LTS regression method is the best analytic technique for
estimation of parameters.
B. PREVIOUS STUDIES WITH FIREPOWER SCORE APPROACHES
Besides the Lanchester equations, another approach for combat attrition is models
that use force ratio in their structure. This thesis focuses on aggregate attrition
methodologies that use combat power ratio to compute the casualties of the force. Unlike
the Lanchester equations, there is no study in the literature that used firepower score
attrition models on real data in which force sizes are available day by day for both sides.
In this research, the ATLAS ground attrition equations [Ref. 13], RAND's
Situational Force Scoring (SFS) [Ref. 7] and Dupuy's Quantified Judgement Models
(QJM) [Ref. 3] are applied to three data sets that are extracted from the data on the Battle
of Kursk.
The ATLAS theater level simulation uses a straightforward force ratio method.
The simplicity of its structure is one of the main attractions of the ATLAS model.
TACWAR is one of the simulations that use the ATLAS equations. In the combat
attrition process of the ATLAS model, the casualty rates are determined by using simple
equations for the attacker and the defender. The original casualty rates used in th=
ATLAS model were derived from data on 37 division level engagements in World War n
and Korea [Ref. 6:p. 4-9]. Since the specific engagements are not documented, it is
unknown as to whether the division-level data includes the battle of Kursk—though it is
believed not to. If it is included, then the comparisons are not strictly independent.
However, since Kursk would be the only one of a large number of engagements (37) the
dependence will be very small. There is no published study on the validation of ATLAS
equations for real combat data.
The second method used in this study is RAND's SFS methodology, which was
proposed by Patrick Allen in 1991 [Ref. 7]. The SFS methodology has been developed to
better account for situation-dependent combined arm's effects in aggregate combat
models [Ref. 7:p. 1]. In the SFS method, the value of a weapon system is varied as a
function of the combat situation, defined by type of terrain and type of battle, and as a
function of shortages in the weapon mix in a given combat situation. The ratio of
attacking combat power to the defending combat power is defined as the "situationally
adjusted" or "modified" force ratio (MFR). The SFS's equations use this modified force
ratio to compute the casualty rates and FEBA (FLOT) movement rates.
The basis for the equations used in the SFS was documented in an unpublished
work by Paul Davis and Patrick Allen in the mid-1980s [Ref. 7:p. 41]. There has been no
effort to date to calibrate these equations or their parameters. Also, this method is not
applied to any real two-sided, daily combat data.
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The last method used in this research is Dupuy's QJM model. In 'his book,
Attrition [Ref. 3], Dupuy presents simple equations to predict the personnel and material
losses of a military force. These equations are incorporated in the Quantified Judgment
Model (QJM) and the Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM), both of which
were developed by Dupuy [Ref. 3:p. 104].
Dupuy applied his methodology retrospectively to a number of historical battles
from 1805 to 1973, with quite good results [Ref. 3.p. 113]. All the data used in his
examples contain only the starting and ending force strength and casualties mostly for
personnel and armor assets. At the end, he presents a scale (such as fair, excellent,
phenomenal) to show his subjective assessments of the relative quality of the forecasts or
estimates. For personnel estimates, the results are as follows [Ref. 3:p. 124]:





For armor estimates the results are as follows [Ref. 3:p. 124]:




Overall, the average deviation for personnel estimates is 9.6%. The average
deviation for armor estimates is 9.0% [Ref. 3:p. 124].
11
STUDY METHODOLOGY
This thesis applies the firepower score attrition models to the data on the Battle of
Kursk. The two main areas of interest are the quality of the fits and the insights provided
by the models. Different models will be compared and contrasted. The methodology used
in this thesis research consists of the following steps:
Arranging and setting up the data on hand to be useful for analysis.
Conducting a through analysis and interpretation of the data.
Extracting three data sets from the original data according to the combat
engagement status of the units.
Applying the ATLAS ground attrition equations to all data sets.
Evaluate the fit of the ATLAS equations apply to the three data sets.
Applying the SFS methodology to the three data sets.
Evaluate the fit of the SFS methodology to the data on the Battle of Kursk.
Evaluate the fit of the FLOT movement rates in the SFS methodology to
the Battle of Kursk.
Applying the QJM models to the Battle of Kursk.
Evaluate the fit of the QJM models apply to three data sets.
Distribute the combat power losses into different types of weapons.
Including the air sorties to the data.
Comparing and contrasting different methodologies.
Analyzing the results and conclusions of all the models.
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III. HISTORYAND DATA ON THE BATTLE OF KURSK
A. A SHORT HISTORY ON THE BATTLE OF KURSK
In the spring of 1943, the Russo-German front was dominated by a salient located
to the north of Kharkov, to the south of Orel, and centered in the city of Kursk. The Kursk
salient had a frontage of 250 miles and 70 miles across its base [Ref. 14:p. 2-2].
In order to regain the initiative in Russia after the reverses in the winter campaign
of 1942-1943, and to strengthen the front line, Hitler decided to launch an offensive
operation known by the code name "Citadel (Zitadelle)" [Ref. 15:p 152] Through this
attack, Hitler wanted to considerably strengthen the front in the Belgorod-Orel area. The
Donets Basin was of great economic importance. Since the front line passed directly
along the eastern edge of the basin, Hitler considered it too insecure and vulnerable to
enemy attack [Ref. 15:p 153]. The German plan was a two-front attack on the Kursk
salient in a classic pincer operation.
Initially the attack was to be launched on 4 May 1943, however, the attack was
postponed until 5 July 1943. Postponement of the attack from May to July 1943
subsequently proved to be a great disadvantage to the Germans. Although Hitler argued
that the delay was necessary in view of an anticipated Allied attack on the Italian coast, it
was clear that the longer the Germans delayed, the more probable it was that the Soviets
would develop defenses to thwart the attack.
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Operation Citadel was launched on July 5, 1943, see Figure 3.1. Using a massivt
armor attack, General Model's 9th Army attacked the northern front of the salient, while
General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army attacked from the southern front [Ref. 14:p. 2-2].
German forces encountered heavy losses as they fell upon the prepared Soviet positions,
which contributed, to Germany's defeat in this campaign.
After an initial gain of a few miles in the first two days of the battle, the 4th Panzer
Army surged forward on 7 July, creating great damage and alarm among Soviet positions
[Ref. 14:p. 2-3]. Despite these heavy losses in men and armor, Soviet reinforcements
were sufficient to restrict the German gain to 25 miles by 12 July.
On 12 July, a German breakthrough attempt resulted in a major close quarters
tank battle near the town of Prokhorovka. This day was a turning point in the battle and
described in the The Battle ofKursk [Ref. 16] as " Immense in scope, ferocious in nature,
and epic in consequences, the Battle of Kursk witnessed (at Prokhorovka) one of the
largest tank engagements in world history and led to staggering losses." Unable to gain a
decisive victory, the Germans drew back into generally defensive postures after this
battle.
Hitler canceled Operation Citadel on 13 July, and later German attacks were
limited in scope. The Soviets began counterattacks on the southern front on 12 July but
shifted primarily defense postures by 14 July. The Soviet counteroffensive resumed on 18
July and they regained all of the ground lost in the theatre by July 23, 1943. [Ref. 14:p. 2-
3]
14
OPERATION Z1TADELLE AND THE
WITHDRAWAL TO THE HA6EN POSITION
5 July -18 August 1943
t \r \ ThC front On * jvt. :>43
•••»••• THE FARTHEST ADVANCE OR OPERATION
ZIT40ELI.E, M JUL 19*3
III. II. II.. THE FOURTH ANO NINTH ARMY PROMTS. It AUG U43
Ll
20 50 *0 SOMX.ES




Figure 3.1. Operation Zitadelle [FromRef. 17:p. 134].
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B. DATA ON THE BATTLE OF KURSK
This section presents the procedure for the extraction of data sets used in this
study. This process was the most difficult and time-consuming process of the study.
1. Creation and Scope of the Kursk Database
In order to improve combat model credibility, the Ardennes Campaign Simulation
(ARCAS) Study [Ref. 18] compared a computerized combat model representation of the
World War II (WWII) 1944-1945 Ardennes Campaign with a database of historical
results from that campaign. This comparison was used to assess the accuracy of the
simulation model and to develop algorithmic changes [Ref. 14:p. 1-1].
Another comparative historical campaign is necessary to test the ARCAS
simulation. The Dupuy Institute (TDI), under contract to the US Army Concepts Analysis
Agency (CAA), collected historical data from forces on the southern front of the Battle of
Kursk, 5 July 1943 through 18 July 1943, from military archives in Germany and Russia
[Ref. 14:p. 1-1]. This data was reformatted as the Kursk DataBase (KDB). The Kursk
Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise (KOSAVE) Study, a follow-on effort to
the ARCAS Study of 1995, was initiated to compare simulated campaign results with
history [Ref. 14:p. 1-1].
The results and products of this simulation are presented in report CAA-SR-98-7
[Ref. 14:p. 1-1]. Additional supplemental data was released with this report on a CD-
ROM [Ref. 19]. All of the data used in this research is extracted from this CD-ROM.
The KOSAVE report includes only the southern front of the World War II
(WWII) Battle of Kursk, as represented in the KDB historical data [Ref. 14:p. v]. Only
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the results and data for combat units in the KDB are included. Non-combat support units
are not covered in this report.
2. Limitations and Timeframe of the Kursk Database
In the KOSAVE report, results are not expressed in terms of specific weapon
types; instead, weapons are aggregated into categories or classes. Human factors such as
leadership, morale, fatigue, caution, and aggressiveness are not quantified. The timeframe
for the data is from 4 July 1943 through 18 July 1943.
3. Assumptions for the Kursk Database
There are three primary assumptions made for the KDB database. The database
accurately represents the status and structure of forces in the southern front of the actual
Battle of Kursk. The personnel casualty and system kill criteria used to categorize KDB
casualty and weapon losses are sufficiently consistent with each other to allow
meaningful reporting and comparisons between combatants. The use of interpolation
techniques for gathering data between inconsistent reports in historical records to create a
complete set of daily report records in the KDB is reasonable [Ref. 14:p. 1-3].
C. METHODOLOGY USED FOR THE EXTRACTION OF THE DATA
The data used throughout this study is extracted from the KOSAVE [Ref. 14]
report. All of the data used in this study are for combat units represented in the KDB.
Support units, such as bridging and logistic units, are excluded in the KOSAVE study.
Twenty-four primary German combat units are represented in the KDB. These 24
primary combat units are composed of 7 headquarters (HQ) units and 17 line units. The
17
17 line units are further partitioned into 8 infantry divisions (IDs), 5 Panzer divisions
(PzDs), and 4 Panzer Grenadier divisions (PzGrDs) [Ref. 14:p. 3-1]. The German HQ
units represented are corps and army level.
There are 67 primary Soviet Combat units represented in the KDB. These are 19
Soviet headquarters units and the 48 line units. The 48 line units are further partitioned
into 35 rifle divisions, 8 tank corps, 2 mechanized corps, 2 airborne divisions, and 1
detachment [Ref. 14:p. 1-3]. The Soviet HQ unit types are armies, rifle corps and the
Voronezh Front.
1. Personnel Data
German and Soviet personnel strengths are used to represent the combat
manpower of combat units for both forces in the southern front Kursk Battle. The
personnel strengths are presented as "onhand" (OH) which represents the available
combat manpower.
Personnel strength losses are killed in action (KIA), wounded in action (WIA),
and captured/missing in action (CMIA). Disease and nonbattle injuries (DNBI) are not
counted as combat losses. Since DNBI are not caused directly by the enemy and only
combat units are taken into account, they are not considered as combat losses in this




The many specific weapon types listed in the KDB were grouped into nine
weapon classes in order to achieve compact summarization [Ref. 14:p. 5-1]. We used this
weapon categorization in appropriate models, but in some models weapons are
categorized differently. The methodology used to demonstrate how data is gathered for
modeling purposes is explained in the section concerning that specific model. The OH
weapon numbers represents the available number of weapons in that category.
Weapon losses are categorized as damaged and destroyed/abandoned. Damaged
weapons are considered as a loss, because a damaged weapon system is considered to be
a "temporary" loss and in a non-operational status. A damaged weapon system is treated
as only a "temporary loss," but the period of non-operational status can be long. Also, a
damaged system will function only with degraded effectiveness and efficiency [Ref. ll:p.
27].
The weapon classes used in the KOSAVE report are: tanks (Tank), armored
personnel carriers (APC), artillery (ARTY), rocket launchers (RKTL), heavy antitank
weapons (ATH), mortar (MTR), light antitank weapons (ATL), flame-throwers and heavy
machineguns (Flame/MG), and antiaircraft weapons (AA). All weapons of each specified
KDB weapon type are in only a single weapon class. Most assignments of weapon types
to classes are the same as those used in the KDB documentation. A weapon type with
dual capability (e.g., antitank and artillery) is assigned to the weapon class representing
what was judged to be its primary function in the battle [Ref. 14:p. 5-1].
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The KOSAVE study gives detailed information for the composition of weapon
classes in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 [Ref. 19:Data98-7, worksheet CHAP5T]. Also, it presents
the OH and losses of all specific weapon types for all combat units. The Data98-7 is in a
Microsoft Excel file on the CD-ROM [Ref. 19], and the CHAP5T is a Microsoft Excel
worksheet in the Data98-7 file. The OH weapon numbers are given on a CD-ROM [Ref.
19:Data98-7, worksheet CHAP5] in nine groups for both sides.
In order to prevent possible confusion on the part of future analysts, the
methodology used for gathering the data for the categorization of weapon types will be
detailed. Each weapon group type is listed below. Tables 5.1, and 5.2 [Ref. 19:Data98-7,
worksheet CHAP5T], are used for this classification.
a. Classification ofGerman Weapon Types
(1) Tanks used in the study:
• Pzm, PzIV, PzV, PzVI
• T-34(Soviet), PzIIIspt
The PzDI Flame and PzEI Observations in the original KDB
documentation where defined as PzIQspt in the KOSAVE report [Ref. 19:Gewpns,
worksheet KDBGEWPNTYPES]. Also, according to Table 5-1 [Ref. 19:Data98-7,
worksheet CHAP5T], the PzIH Flame is assigned to the Flame/MG weapon category.
When the number of each weapon type defined in Table 5-1 was summed from the OH
weapon numbers [Ref. 19:Gewpns, worksheet GEOHWPNS], the total number was not
the same as the number of the Flame/MG weapon group shown in Figure 5-5 [Ref.
19:Data98-7, worksheet CHAP5]. Further analysis showed that the PzIIIspt should be
placed in the tank weapon category [Ref. 20].
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(2) Artillery used in the study:
• AC8w 75mm, MHT75mmIG, 75mm It IG
• 87.6mm How, 105mm How, 150mm How, 152mm How, 155mm How,
210mm How
• 105mm Gun, 150mm Gun
• Wespe, StuH, Grille, Hummel
(3) APC used in the study:
• AC4-6w, AC8w, LHT, MHT
• LHT8 lmmmtr, LHT37mmAT, MHT37mmAT
• LHTspt, MHTspt, ACspt
• Pz I, Pz II, MHT Flame
There are also some errors in the classification of the APCs in the
KOSAVE study. The MHT Flame is in the Flame/MG weapon group, but when it is
included in this weapon group, the total numbers do not match as described above in the
tank categorization. The second problem is that the LHT8 lmmmtr is defined in the MTR
weapon group. Once again, the total MTR OH number in Figure 5-5 [Ref.l2:Data98-7,
worksheet CHAP51 do not match the number obtained from the summation of each MTR
weapon types defined in Table 5-1 [Ref. 19:Gewpns, worksheet GEOHWPNS]. Both the
MHT Flame and LHT8 lmmmtr weapon types are defined in the APC weapon category in
this study.









(6) Mortars (MTR) used in this study:
• 50mm mtr, 81mm mtr
• MHT81mmmtr, 82mm mtr
As mentioned above in the APC classification, although the
LHT81mmmtr is in the MTR weapon group in Table 5-1 [Ref. 19:Data98-7, worksheet
CHAP5T], it is put into APC weapon group.
(7) Light antitank (ATH) weapons used in this study:
• 45/50mm AT, 28/20mm AT
• 37mm AT, ATR
(8) Flame/MG used in this study:
• Flamethr
• MMG
Although the MHT Flame and Pz III Flame are in the Flame/MG weapon
group in Table 5-1 [Ref. 19:Data98-7, worksheet CHAP5T], the MHT Flame is put into
the APC and the Pz IE Flame is put into tank weapon groups.
(9) Antiaircraft (AA) weapons used in this study
• 20mm AA
• 37mm AA, 88mm AA
b. Classification of Soviet Weapon Types
(1) Tanks used in the study:
• KV-1 , KV-2, M-3, MK-2/3
• MK-4, T-34, T-60, T-70
22
(2) Artillery used in the study:
• SU-122, 122mmGun, 122mmHow
• 152mmGun, SU-152, 203mmHow
The summation of each artillery weapon type defined in Table 5-1 from
the OH weapon numbers [Ref. 19:Gewpns, worksheet GEOHWPNS] do not match the
number of the artillery weapon groups shown in Figure 5-5 [Ref. 19:Data98-7, worksheet
CHAP5]. In this study, we used the number obtained from the summation of each artillery
weapon type.
(3) APC used in the study:
• BA-64, BA-10
• Armtpt, Bren
(4) Rocket Launchers used in this study:
• BM-13
(5) Heavy antitank (ATH) weapons used in this study:
• 57mm AT, 76mmGun
• 85mm AT
The summation of each ATH weapon type defined in Table 5-1 from the
OH weapon numbers [Ref. 19:Gewpns, worksheet GEOHWPNS] do not match the
number of ATH weapon groups shown in Figure 5-5 [Ref. 19:Data98-7, worksheet
CHAP5]. In this study, we used the number obtained from the summation of each ATH
weapon type.
(6) Mortars (MTR) used in this study:
• 50mmmtr, 82mm mtr
• 120mm mtr
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(7) Light antitank (ATH) weapons used in th<. f
45mmAT
ATR
(8) Flame/MG used in this study:
Flame, MG
AAMG
(9) Antiaircraft (AA) weapons used in this stud 1
25mmAA, 37mmAA
40mmAA, 85mmAA
The summation of each AA weapon type in Tal e 5-1 H
weapon numbers [Ref. 19:Gewpns, worksheet GEOHWPNS] do not match th c
AA weapon groups given in Figure 5-5 [Ref. 19:Data98-7, worksheet CHAPi-j is
study, we used the number obtained from the summation of each AA weapon type.
3. Unit Activities and Combat Postures
One of the interesting aspects of this battle is the engagement percentages of the
forces. The Germans had a considerably larger portion of their forces in contact. This
suggests that the German force may have been subjected to more fatigue than the Soviets.
With an average of 97 percent of its heavy mechanized force on the front lines, the
Germans, unlike the Soviets, had no reserves to use [Ref. 14:p. 9-4].
The KDB records the daily contact status and combat posture of each of the 17
German line units and each of the 48 Soviet line units. Units in contact with the enemy
are further partitioned into those in active contact (fighting) and those that are in contact
but not in active contact. Depending on this contact status, this study extracts three
different data sets from the data on the Battle of Kursk in the KOSAVE report.
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The first data set, all combat units data (ACUD), includes all combat units:
contact, out of contact, active, and inactive, including HQ above division level.
The second data set, contact combat units data (CCUD), includes only combat
units those are in contact with the enemy: units in contact fighting and not fighting, HQ
above division level is excluded [Ref. 14:p. 5-9].
The third data set, fighting combat units data (FCUD), includes only combat units
that are in contact and fighting with the enemy: HQ above division level are excluded
[Ref. 14:p. 5-9].
The reason for setting these data sets is to search for the influences of the unit's
contact status on the attrition rates. Since the vast majority of the Soviet units were not
engaged directly with the enemy, they were not supposed to have as many casualties as
the German units suffered.
The KDB also records the combat postures of units; attack, delay, hasty defense,
prepared defense, and other (usually denoting reserve/transit status). Appendix E [Ref.
14] shows the daily contact and combat postures for each line unit of each force.
The majority of the German units were continually attacking from 5 July through
12 July, but almost all were in prepared defense by 17 July. The vast majority of Soviet
line units were in defense postures each day except 12 July, when the Soviets
counterattacked. The temporary success of the Germans in meeting the 12 July Soviet
counterattack is evident in the shift of the vast majority of attacking Soviets units to hasty
defense postures by 14 July [Ref. 14:p. 3-8].
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The following figures show the unit status and postures for both sides. Figure 3.2
presents the percentages of line units in each force, which were in contact with the
enemy. Figure 3.3 shows the percentages of line units in each force, which were
attacking. In all models, the attacking side is defined according to the percentages
depicted in Figure 3.3. Until day 9 (12 July), it is clear that the Germans were the
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Figure 3.2. Line Units in Contact. The vast majority of German units are in contact
each day while the Soviets have an increasing percentage.
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Figure 3.3. Line Units Attacking. Except for days 10, 14, and 15, the Germans have a
higher attacking percentage. Although on day 9(12 July), the Germans have a slightly
higher ratio, based on historical attributes, it is assumed that the Soviets are attacking on
this day.
Although on day 9 (12 July), the Germans had a slightly higher ratio of attacker
units, based on the historical attributes, it is assumed that the Soviets were attacking on
this day [Ref. 14:p. 3-7] [Ref. 16:p. 197] [Ref. 21 :p. 225]. Although they have almost the
same percentage on day 10, the Soviets are defined as the attacking side. On day 13, the
Germans are defined as the attacking side, and on the last 2 days the Soviets are
considered to be the attacking side.
In the attrition models in which a force ratio is used, an attacking side must be
determined to calculate the attrition and the advance rates. However, in reality the
attacking side may not be decided in some cases, like days 10, 13, 14. In the last days,
less than 20 percent of the forces are really considered as attacking. This fact should be
considered in all models throughout this study.
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the combat posture of each force. The vast majority of
the German forces are in an attacking posture for the start of the battle. After 12 July, they
are almost all in a defense posture. On most days, they do not have any forces in reserve.
Unlike the Germans, most Soviet units are in a defense posture, either prepared or hasty.
The highest attacking unit numbers are on 12, 13, and 18 July. On almost all these days,
they have reserve forces. In all models in this study, the defender's combat posture is
defined according to Figures 3.4 and 3.5. In all models, the defender's posture is decided
according to the percentages shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5.
The following three sections present the personnel and weapon OH and loss
numbers of the three data sets, which were extracted from the data given in the KOSAVE
study.






Figure 3.4. Daily Percentages of German Units in Each Combat Posture. The vast
majority of units are in an attacking status.
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Figure 3.5. Daily Percentages of Soviet Units in Each Combat Posture. The vast
4.
majority of units are in prepared in a hasty defense posture.
All Combat Units Data (ACUD)
All combat units data (ACUD) includes all units; contact, out of contact, active,
inactive, and including HQ above division level. The two tables below show the OH data.
Day Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 307365 1178 1277 1230 340 665 1550 494 1970 1055
2 301341 986 1254 1199 340 618 1489 488 1938 1048
3 297205 749 1249 1185 338 590 1483 483 1931 1045
4 293960 673 1237 1158 338 549 1479 481 1917 1022
5 306659 596 1296 1141 338 586 1623 525 2063 1051
6 303879 490 1296 1129 338 590 1596 518 2057 1051
7 302014 548 1281 1172 335 595 1587 514 2055 1047
8 300050 563 1286 1161 335 584 1585 513 2027 1058
9 298710 500 1268 1157 334 572 1579 506 2019 1045
10 299369 495 1262 1155 333 548 1591 499 2012 1057
11 297395 480 1258 1152 333 547 1584 487 2009 1043
12 296237 426 1258 1148 331 550 1576 481 1995 1039
13 296426 495 1255 1151 330 560 1575 470 1989 1047
14 296350 557 1258 1154 330 558 1574 471 1988 1050
15 295750 588 1250 1156 323 561 1573 465 1978 1059
Table 3.1. Daily German Onhand Personnel and Weapon Data. All Combat Units are
included.
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Day Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 510252 2500 718 511 319 2363 7374 17091 6612 704
2 507698 2396 705 507 315 2243 7163 16407 6408 704
3 498884 2367 676 501 312 2167 6883 15727 6119 712
4 489175 2064 661 490 308 2046 6633 15077 57i- 680
5 481947 1754 648 477 309 1923 6458 145 552 65
6 470762 1495 640 458 308 1837 44 14051 527- "2
8
7 460808 1406 629 463 307 1775 '6 5449 502^
8 453126 1351 628 462 304 1698 1 12964 4850
9 433813 977 613 432 302 1628 1 12245 4583
10 423351 978 606 424 298 1591 > 11851 4434
11 415254 907 603 418 295 1587 5. 11542 4230 j
12 419374 883 601 417 295 1539 5C 1301 4134 ( 3
13 416666 985 600 417 293 1571 49, "93 3997 i
14 415461 978 602 417 291 1574 4933 079 3972
15 413298 948 591 409 288 1542 4902 ^67 3850 645
Table 3.2. Daily Soviet Onhand Personnel and Weapon Dai
included.
Combat Units are
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show daily personnel and weapon losses.
Day Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 657 4 1 1
2 6049 198 25 32 50 61 6 32 8
3 4157 248 5 14 2 29 6 5 7 3
4 3271 121 12 27 42 4 2 14 23
5 2780 108 13 17 12 4 5 6 14
6 2793 139 6 14 27 27 7 6 12
7 1879 36 18 42 3 14 9 5 2 22
8 2306 63 17 17 25 2 5 28 13
9 2450 98 18 11 1 28 6 8 8 12
10 1893 57 8 3 1 30 5 7 7 21
11 1985 46 7 6 7 7 12 3 14
12 1163 79 3 5 2 16 8 8 14 4
13 1161 23 4 1 1 5 1 11 6 4
14 786 7 2 1 13 1 3 1 1
15 887 6 12 5 7 9 4 8 10 9
TOTAL 34217 1233 151 195 17 307 145 92 145 160
Table 3.3. Daily German Personnel and Weapon Losses. Notice that on the first day
the losses are very small. Almost all losses show a descending pattern indicating that the




Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 114 2 1 1
2 8445 105 13 4 4 120 211 682 204
3 9325 117 30 6 3 79 286 707 293 2
4 10339 259 15 11 4 119 245 635 328 24
5 9421 315 14 13 3 113 175 501 264 24
6 11625 289 9 19 1 97 202 526 248 6
7 10724 157 13 3 1 65 267 586 251 3
8 7697 135 7 4 3 87 200 502 187 2
9 19363 414 16 30 2 84 289 723 290 3
10 10470 117 10 8 4 45 162 387 153
11 8674 118 5 8 5 46 155 334 185 1
12 4038 96 5 1 62 123 250 99
13 2905 27 3 2 14 182 239 146
14 1182 42 2 2 1 12 34 29
15 3230 85 4 8 4 30 64 163 120
TOTAL 117552 2276 144 117 38 962 2575 6270 2798 65
Table 3.4. Daily Soviet Personnel and Weapon Losses. Notice that on the first day
losses are very small, like the German losses. Almost all losses show a descending pattern
except for the ninth day of the battle. This day is the bloodiest tank battle in history.
5. Contact Combat Units Data (CCUD)
CCUD includes only combat units in contact with the enemy: units in contact
fighting and not fighting, HQ above division level is excluded [Ref. 14:p. 5-9].
Day Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 265823 942 1136 1207 310 630 1372 471 1842 905
2 262055 965 1123 1182 310 583 1329 465 1811 898
3 276383 731 1194 1168 320 588 1479 482 1929 997
4 273660 652 1182 1141 338 547 1475 480 1915 974
5 275511 564 1212 1124 338 557 1471 475 1909 1030
6 287391 389 1205 962 320 545 1506 485 1853 984
7 248538 525 1170 1155 335 566 1435 464 1901 984
8 279722 563 1244 1144 281 582 1581 512 2025 1007
9 279046 483 1227 1140 334 570 1575 505 2017 994
10 279697 495 1233 1138 333 546 1587 498 2010 964
11 276604 474 1229 1135 333 541 1576 486 2007 950
12 291571 418 1229 1131 331 543 1568 480 1993 946
13 289582 480 1212 1134 330 553 1555 469 1987 954
14 237336 441 1126 957 315 501 1486 420 1790 812
15 235653 472 1152 959 305 484 1485 414 1780 788
Table 3.5. Daily German CCUD Onhand Personnel and Weapon Data.
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Day Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 138378 129 184 11 96 614 2494 5393 1798 9
2 181474 396 211 61 142 726 3000 6228 2315 47
3 221666 1006 209 235 150 845 3230 6563 2556 84
4 238993 980 228 234 125 851 3165 6645 2479 106
5 256687 742 221 227 148 966 3507 7198 2580 113
6 284050 830 239 261 148 997 3660 7589 2736 160
7 297105 869 269 312 126 1066 4013 8214 3077 150
8 358172 1158 331 420 146 1257 4942 9911 4048 191
9 344513 832 339 353 122 1216 4939 9848 3998 168
10 339299 875 342 414 164 1206 4829 9613 3923 184
11 330225 784 340 403 161 1164 4673 9335 3721 174
12 302666 715 337 352 139 1127 4454 8915 3573 149
13 272394 573 330 291 109 1041 4140 8375 3352 127
14 263878 569 313 291 59 1020 4073 8093 3259 127
15 282532 624 318 333 65 1022 4102 8050 3184 152
Table 3.6. Daily Soviet CCUD Onhand Personnel and Weapon Data.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show personnel and weapon losses.
Day Personne
I
Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 651 1 1
2 5823 180 19 32 50 61 6 31 8
3 4133 240 3 14 2 29 6 5 7 3
4 3249 113 12 27 42 4 2 14 23
5 2746 108 13 17 12 4 5 6 14
6 2677 102 5 14 26 27 7 6 11
7 1851 36 18 42 3 14 9 5 2 22
8 2294 63 17 17 25 2 5 28 13
9 2435 92 17 11 1 28 6 8 8 12
10 1880 57 8 3 1 30 5 7 7 21
11 1966 41 9 6 6 7 12 3 14
12 1151 79 3 5 2 16 8 8 14 4
13 1150 22 4 1 1 5 1 11 6 4
14 734 4 2 1 9 1 3 1 1
15 866 5 11 5 7 8 4 8 10 9
TOTAL 110016 2053 110 96 21 699 2512 5807 2691 16




Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 104 2 1 1
2 8227 73 8 4 2 108 209 644 204
3 8880 101 25 6 1 64 277 660 288 2
4 9001 255 9 11 1 90 230 562 309 6
5 7907 300 9 11 77 156 411 223 3
6 10678 228 9 7 70 202 496 239 1
7 10195 116 10 3 52 266 566 247 1
8 7444 125 5 3 2 56 200 473 184
9 18884 392 16 25 2 63 283 671 290 2
10 10169 110 6 7 4 31 162 363 151
11 8390 114 4 8 5 33 152 310 180 1
12 3841 93 2 1 16 115 230 99
13 2781 27 3 2 14 182 239
'
146
14 1120 34 2 2 1 12 29 19
15 3170 85 4 8 24 64 152 111
TOTAL 110791 2053 110 96 21 699 2512 5807 2691 16
Table 3.8. Daily Soviet CCUD Personnel and Weapon Losses.
6. Fighting Combat Units Data (FCUD)
FCUD includes only combat units in contact and fighting with the enemy: HQ
above division level are excluded [Ref. 14:p. 5-9].
Day Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 97740 290 437 318 61 241 604 150 671 241
2 247866 965 1064 1182 310 557 1224 434 1727 898
3 261368 731 1131 1168 308 555 1326 461 1804 985
4 211212 652 921 1141 272 423 926 400 1476 826
5 227314 564 1014 1124 284 468 1075 417 1598 864
6 224664 389 947 962 284 434 1023 369 1439 816
7 200686 525 985 1155 299 490 1104 398 1639 828
8 232938 563 1060 1144 281 506 1250 444 1763 851
9 262920 483 1176 1140 334 542 1439 491 1936 994
10 279697 495 1233 1138 333 546 1587 498 2010 964
11 208498 415 955 970 232 392 1141 392 1539 627
12 226075 356 1027 966 250 437 1300 399 1630 755
13 131800 193 540 514 140 214 664 214 788 416
14 149538 363 640 792 204 249 640 250 982 599
15 188079 352 891 744 228 360 1094 323 1333 622
Table 3.9. Daily German FCUD Onhand Personnel and Weapon Data.
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Day Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1
2 84783 83 126 10 118 334 1309 3093 1119 9
3 141589 605 147 175 150 554 1813 4040 1635 70
4 163378 980 157 232 77 541 1972 4369 1741 106
5 145875 646 112 221 78 489 1729 3720 1473 104
6 179607 352 162 162 103 674 2421 5061 1796 71
7 166526 483 139 163 126 586 1971 4107 1462 111
8 219343 480 202 201 76 761 3087 5999 2369 125
9 252844 525 262 231 115 914 3698 7275 3012 128
10 175121 349 213 114 44 688 2970 5768 2352 63
11 206465 513 204 293 117 720 2947 6006 2415 123
12 89898 68 113 16 48 317 1507 2806 1193 13
13 87769 76 124 16 24 336 1380 2887 1178 14
14 37981 108 36 16 136 631 1174 475 29
15 119346 408 127 176 65 438 1725 3269 1350 114
Table 3.10. Daily Soviet FCUD Onhand Personnel and Weapon Data.
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show personnel and weapon losses.
Day Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1 607 1 1
2 5736 180 19 32 50 61 6 31 8
3 3471 240 3 14 2 29 3 4 7 3
4 2933 113 12 27 42 4 2 11 23
5 2622 108 13 17 10 4 4 3 14
6 2516 102 5 14 25 12 5 5 11
7 1723 36 17 42 3 14 5 4 2 22
8 2217 63 11 17 24 2 5 28 13
9 2426 92 17 11 1 28 6 8 8 12
10 1880 57 8 3 1 30 5 7 7 21
11 1553 41 3 6 6 3 10 2 14
12 934 75 2 5 10 8 6 14 4
13 387 13 4 3 1 4 6 1
14 418 4 1 1 4 2 1
15 699 5 8 4 6 5 3 3 10 9
rOTAL 30122 1129 124 193 13 280 117 70 136 155
Table 3.11. Daily German FCUD Personnel and Weapon Losses.
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Day Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/MG AA
1
2 8194 68 8 4 2 105 209 644 204
3 8797 73 25 6 1 61 277 653 288
4 8840 255 7 11 1 85 230 547 308 6
5 7493 287 9 10 69 150 399 193 3
6 8549 145 9 7 60 192 415 203 1
7 8094 108 6 3 41 227 496 216 1
8 6593 115 4 2 2 50 175 413 166
9 18042 375 15 24 2 58 261 611 255 1
10 8661 36 5 4 4 25 135 286 104
11 6124 99 4 6 5 24 115 209 135 1
12 2466 6 1 11 71 125 60
13 2105 3 14 173 180 115
14 448 6 1 4 14 8
15 2395 84 8 14 48 137 98
rOTAL 96801 1657 96 85 17 618 2267 5129 2353 13
Table 3.12. Daily Soviet FCUD Personnel and Weapon Losses.
D. STATISTICAL COMPARISONS OF PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS
1. Personnel Statistics
This section presents statistical comparisons of German and Soviet personnel
strength and casualties in the Battle of Kursk.
a. Onhand Personnel
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the percentages of contact and not in contact OH
personnel strength for the Germans and Soviets respectively. Almost all of the available
German personnel strength was engaged after the first day (4 July). The Germans have a
greater in contact ratio than the Soviets each day. The Soviet engagement fraction peaked
during days 8-11 (11-14 July) at 80-84 percent and dropped to 70 percent by the last day
(18 July).
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From 5 through 18 July (days 2-15), percentage of German engagement
never dropped below 86 percent. Since rest and replenishment were minimal in such a
heavily committed force, the effectiveness and efficiency of German combat elements
probably deteriorated over time relative to that of the Soviet force [Ref. 14:p. 4-2].
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the percentage of fighting and not fighting
personnel strength for the units in contact of the Germans and Soviets respectively. The
vast majority of German personnel strength is in a fighting status except for the first and
thirteenth days. Unlike the Germans, the Soviets have less personnel strength in fighting
status, especially on the first day.
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Figure 3.6. German Onhand Personnel in Contact/Not in Contact. Almost all German
personnel are in contact with an average of 93 percentages.
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Figure 3.7 Soviet Onhand Personnel in Contact/Not in Contact. The ratio of contact
personnel strength increases until the eight day.
Percentage of German OH Personnel in Fighting / Not Fighting
Not Fighting
Fighting
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Day
Figure 3.8. German Onhand Personnel in Fighting/Not Fighting. On the first day, the
fighting personnel ratio is less than 40 percent.
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Figure 3.9 Soviet Onhand Personnel in Fighting/Not Fighting. On the first day, the
Soviets were not engaged with the enemy.
b. Personnel Casualties
Figure 3.10 presents the ratio of German personnel losses in contact and
not in contact combat units. All German personnel losses come from the contact combat
units. Figure 3.11 shows the ratio of Soviet personnel losses in contact and not in contact
combat units. Almost all Soviet personnel losses come from the contact combat units.
Figure 3.12 presents the German personnel loss ratios for the Fighting/Not
Fighting combat units out of contact units. Nearly all of the German personnel losses
come from the fighting units, although for days 13 and 14, the ratio is slightly lower than
the other days. However, this not an unexpected result, because still the rest of the losses
come from the contact combat units. Like Figure 3.12, Figure 3.13 presents the Soviet
personnel loss ratios for the Fighting/Not Fighting combat units out of contact units.
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Since the Soviets do not have any units in fighting position, they did not suffer any
casualties on the very first day. Historical accounts support the fact that the Kursk
offensive did not effectively begin until July 5, 1943.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show the comparison of the German and the Soviet
personnel losses for ACUD and FCUD respectively. Both figures show that the Soviets
suffered more casualties than the Germans each day. The Germans suffered many more
personnel losses at the beginning of the battle when they attacked the heavily mined and
fortified Soviet defense. The peak Soviet personnel losses occur on the ninth day (12
July) of the battle.
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Figure 3.10. German Personnel Losses in Contact/Not in Contact. Almost all German
personnel losses come from the contact units.
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Figure 3.1 1 Soviet Personnel Losses in Contact/Not in Contact. The majority of the
Soviet personnel losses come from the contact units.
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Figure 3.12. German Personnel Loss Ratios for Fighting/Not Fighting Combat Units in
Contact. Except for the 13
th
and 14th days, almost all the German losses come from the
fighting units.
40

















12 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Day
Figure 3.13. Soviet Personnel Loss Ratios for Fighting/Not Fighting Combat Units in
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Figure 3.14. Comparison of Daily Personnel Losses in ACUD for Both Forces.
41

















12 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Day
Figure 3.15. Comparison of Daily Personnel Losses in FCUD for Both Forces.
2. Tank Statistics
This section presents statistical comparisons of German and Soviet tank strength
and casualties during the campaign for the purpose of providing insight into the Battle of
Kursk regarded as, perhaps, the greatest armor battle in history.
a. Onhand Tanks
Figures 3.16 and 3.17 show the percentages of contact and not in contact
OH tank numbers for the Germans and the Soviets respectively. Almost all of the German
tanks were engaged during the campaign. The Germans have a greater in contact ratio
than the Soviets in all days. The Soviet engagement fraction peaked during days 8-12(11-
15 July) with an average of 90 percent.
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Figures 3.18 and 3.19 show the percentage of fighting and not fighting OH
tank numbers in contact for the Germans and the Soviets respectively. The vast majority
of German personnel strength is in a fighting status except for the first and thirteenth days
as in the personnel strength explained in Section 1
.
From Figure 3.19, it is clear that the Soviets have very small percentages
of their tanks in contact with the enemy except on the fourth day. The peak day for the
Soviets is 7 July (day 4) in which all Soviets tanks were engaged with the enemy. They do
not have any tanks engaged on the first day and a very small percentage on days 12, 13,
and 14. Remember that both fighting and not fighting units are in contact status.
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Figure 3.16. German Onhand Tanks in Contact/Not in Contact. Almost all German
personnel are in contact with an average of 90 percent.
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Figure 3.17. Soviets Onhand Tanks in Contact/Not in Contact. The ratio of contact tank








Figure 3.18. German Tank Strength Ratios for Fighting/Not Fighting Combat Units in
Contact. On days 1 and 13, the fighting tank strength ratio is less than 40 percent.
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Figure 3.19. Soviet Tank Strength Ratios for Fighting/Not Fighting Combat Units in
Contact. On the first day, all Soviet tank strength is in not fighting status.
Figure 3.20 presents the comparison of the number of tanks in ACUD for the
Soviets and Germans. The Soviets have tank superiority over the Germans during the
battle. Figure 3.21 shows that when the fighting units are considered, the Germans almost
have the same number of tanks, even though on some days they have more tanks than the
Soviets.
b. Tank Losses
Kursk has been cited as the largest tank battle in history. This is especially
true for the battle at Prokhorovka (on July 12), which was the turning point in the Kursk
campaign, in which an unprecedented number of German and Soviet tanks engaged in
direct combat [Ref. 10].
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Figure 3.22 shows the comparison of daily tank losses for both forces in
ACUD. In the first three days, the Germans have more tank losses than the Soviets. The
peak losses of the Germans happened on the second and third day (5 and 6 July). In the
rest of the campaign, the Soviets suffer much more tank casualties than the Germans. On
the ninth day (12 July), the Soviets lost 414 tanks. This is the heaviest loss of tanks in a
battle in history.
Figure 3.23 presents the comparison of tank losses in FCUD. On the first
day, both forces did not lose any tanks in active contact, which also supports the fact that
the actual battle began on the second day (5 July). After the 9th day (12 July), the tank
losses for both sides decreased, supporting the fact that the battle lost its intensity after
July 12, 1943. The lowest number of tank losses for both forces are on the 13 rd and 14th
days. The trend of tank losses of the forces supported by historical accounts should be
considered in the models throughout this study.
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Figure 3.20. Comparison of Daily Tank Strength for the Germans and the Soviets.
46





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Day
Figure 3.2 1 . Comparison of Daily Tank Strength in FCUD for Both Forces.














Figure 3.22. Comparison of Tank Losses of Both Forces in ACUD.
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Figure 3.23. Comparison of Tank Losses of Both Forces in FCUD.
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IV. APPLICATION OF DIFFERENT METHODOLOGIES TO THE
DATA ON THE BATTLE OF KURSK
This chapter applies three different Firepower score approaches to the three
different data sets that were extracted from the data on the Battle of Kursk. The three
Firepower score algorithms are the ATLAS ground attrition, RAND's Situational Force
Scoring, and Dupuy's QJM methods. For all three cases a comparison is made between
the estimated losses and real losses.
A. APPLICATION OF ATLAS GROUND ATTRITION MODEL
In this section, the ATLAS ground attrition algorithm is applied to the data on the
Battle of Kursk. This method is applied to three different data sets. These data sets were
extracted from the data on the Battle of Kursk [Ref. 14] according to the combat
engagement status, which were presented in detail in Chapter III.C.
The ATLAS ground attrition algorithm works as follows. First, all weapon types
are aggregated into a single scalar measure of the combat power for each side. Then, the
ratio of attacker combat power to defender combat power is computed. The ATLAS
ground attrition algorithm uses the ratio of attacker combat power to defender combat
power to determine the amount of combat power destroyed by the enemy. Once the
combat power losses are calculated, the losses are allocated to the different weapon
groups. A comparison is made between the estimated and real losses.
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Section 1 explains how the firepower score values are determined. The allocation
of combat power losses to different weapon categories is presented in Section 2.e. In
Sections 2, 3, and 4, the ATLAS attrition algorithm is applied to each of the all combat
units (ACUD), contact combat units (CCUD) and fighting combat units (FCUD) data
sets. Section 5 shows how including combat power of the air sorties affect the quality of
the fits. The air sortie data contains bombing and ground attack air sorties that should be
directly affecting the ground attrition. In Section 6, the firepower score values used in
Bracken's [Ref. 8] and Flicker's [Ref. 9] analyses of the Ardennes campaign and
Clemens's [Ref. 10] and Turkes's [Ref. 11] analyses of the Battle of Kursk. Note: all
these authors used the same weights.
1. Determining Firepower Score Values
Several approaches to determining firepower score values have been used over the
years [Ref. 6]. None of the methods are completely satisfactory because the simple
addition of scalar scores cannot capture the variety of characteristics and interactions in a
complex combat environment [Ref. 6]. RAND proposed a new ground force scoring
system to replace the WEI/WUV (Weapon Effectiveness Index, Weighted Unit Value
system) [Ref. 7]. They categorize weapons into 13 groups, such as tanks, APCs, and
mortars. These weapon groups consist of different weapon categories. As an example, the
tank weapon group includes the Ml-Al, M60 and Ml tank categories. Each category
includes weapons that are qualitatively about 30 percent or so different from weapons in
other categories within the same group. This provides sufficient homogeneity so that each
weapon within a category can use the same score [Ref. 7].
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Since killer-victim (KV) scoreboards are not available, there was not an objective
method to use. RAND's force scoring system was the most detailed and well-documented
system that we have. Thus, we use these firepower score values as a baseline to aggregate
the weapon groups presented in the KDB. Since the weapons in the data on the Battle of
Kursk are not the same as RAND's weapon categories (based on 1991 systems) [Ref. 7],
firepower score values relative to RAND's firepower score values are determined. Table
4.1 shows RAND's weapon groups, categories and minimum and maximum scores for
each weapon group. For more detailed information about the weapon categories, see [Ref.
7: p. 88]. According to the average scores, a tank is about five times more valuable than a
mortar, an artillery piece is roughly four times more valuable than a short range anti-tank
weapon and so on.
The KDB does not include killer-victim data, which would allow for the use of an
objective Firepower score approach, such as an Anti-Potential Potential method [Ref. 6].
As explained in detail in Chapter m, the KOSAVE II [Ref. 14] report uses nine
weapon groups. The firepower score values assigned to these weapon categories are
presented in Table 4.2. The tanks are chosen as the base weapon category with a
firepower score value of 100. Firepower score values are not assigned to each specific
weapon type, rather it is assumed that all weapon types have the same score value in their
weapon group. Therefore, all tank types have the same firepower score value of 100.
Other weapon groups are assigned to their firepower score values relative to RAND's
score proportions. For instance, mortars are five times less valuable than the tanks, so
they have a firepower score value of 20.
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Tanks have the highest score. In RAND's scores, rocket launcher systems are in
the artillery group. In order to be consistent with the nine weapon groups defined in the
KOSAVE II [Ref. 14] report, rocket launchers are considered separately. As they are
more valuable than the field artillery, they have slightly higher firepower score value.
Group Category Minimum Score Maximum Score Average Score
Tanks M1-A1,M1,M60 1.0 7.5 5
IFV/AA M-2, BMP-1 2.5 3.5 3
ARV/AA ITV, ATGM 1.5 2.5 2
LARV Lgt. Veh. 0.8 0.8 0.8
APC EFV/No AT, APC 0.8 1.3 1
LRAArm Imp TOWTVeh 0.8 1.5 1.2
SRAArm Dragon, LAWs 0.2 1 0.6
Mortar 8 1 mm, 60 mm. 0.4 1.2 0.8
Sm Arm Small Arms .15 .15 .15
SPArty 100+ Mortar 1.5 5 4
Td Arty 122+ mm Gn/Hw 1.0 3 2.5
At. Hel AH-64, Hind 3.5 10 7
Adef 20+ mm SP ADA 0.4 1.5 1.2
Table 4.1. RAND's Firepower Score Values. The weapon categories are not
comprehensive. More details can be found in [Ref. 7:p. 88].
Weapon
Groups





1 100 20 80 90 25 20 20 10 25
Table 4.2. Firepower Score Values Used for the Nine Weapon Groups in KDB.
These scores are computed relative to RAND's firepower scores.
2. The Application of the ATLAS Ground Attrition Method to the All
Combat Units Data (ACUD)
This section applies the ATLAS ground attrition process to the All Combat Units
data (ACUD). The data used in this section counts all combat units, including active,
inactive, contact and out of contact units. To aggregate the combat power, the firepower




The formation of the data from the KOSAVE II report is presented in
Chapter m, Section 4. The data, ACUD, used in this section was presented in Chapter
DI.C.4. OH personnel and weapon strengths for both sides are shown in Tables 3.1 and
3.2 respectively. Personnel and weapon losses of the German and the Soviet forces are
presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 respectively.
b. Combat Power
The firepower score approach measures the combat power of a unit by
summing the combat power values for each weapon group in the unit [Ref. 6:pp. 4-3].
The data used in this study represent only the southern front part of the Battle of Kursk.
As presented in Chapter HI, all units are aggregated into one level. Most firepower score
models represent the unit at the division level, but the currently available data does not
represent the unit-level engagements. That is, it is not known which German division
engaged which Soviet unit.
The combat power of one side is computed as follows. First, the combat
power values for each weapon type are calculated by multiplying the number of weapons
by the corresponding firepower score value of that weapon type. Then, the combat power
values of the nine weapon groups are summed to represent the total combat power of that
side. The combat power is computed each day using personnel on hand and weapon
numbers. Equation 1.1 is used to compute the combat power of a force.
Table 4.3 presents the combat power value for each weapon type. Combat
power shows the relative combat power of the Germans on each day. The first day has the
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highest combat power, or 4 July 1943, the beginning of the battle. Table 4.4 shows the
combat power values for each weapon type and the combat power of the Soviets. The
Germans are outnumbered at least 2:1 in tanks and at least 3:1 in heavy antitank (ATH),
machineguns (Flame/MG), mortars, and light antitank (ATL) weapons throughout the
battle. German superiority exists only for artillery, rocket launchers, and armored
personnel carriers (APC). In fact, the German artillery combat power value is greater than
their tank combat power. The German artillery combat power does not change much
during the campaign as artillery suffers relatively few casualties when compared to tanks
or APCs. The major fluctuation is seen in steadily declining tank combat power values.
On the other hand, all Soviet weapon combat powers drop consistently throughout the
battle.
c. Computation ofForce Ratio
Once the combat power of both sides is computed, the next step is to
calculate the force ratio. Force ratio is always determined by dividing the combat power
of all attacking forces by the combat power of all defenders forces.
The force ratio represents the relative combat power in the battle. Table
4.5 shows the combat powers for the Germans and Soviets and the attacker's force ratio.
The attacking side and defender's postures are also presented in this table. The process as
to how the attacking side is determined is explained in Chapter III Section C.3. This force
ratio does not represent other qualitative combat variables, such as leadership, fatigue,
morale, surprise, terrain and training. These variables, which might have a significant
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effect on the combat, are not explicitly represented in the ATLAS ground attrition
process.





1 301341 98600 100320 23980 30600 15450 29780 9760 19380 26200 0.655
2 297205 74900 99920 23700 30420 14750 29660 9660 19310 26125 0.625
3 293960 67300 98960 23160 30420 13725 29580 9620 19170 25550 0.611
4 306659 59600 103680 22820 30420 14650 32460 10500 20630 26275 0.627
5 303879 49000 103680 22580 30420 14750 31920 10360 20570 26275 0.613
6 302014 54800 102480 23440 30150 14875 31740 10280 20550 26175 0.616
7 300050 56300 102880 23220 30150 14600 31700 10260 20270 26450 0.615
8 298710 50000 101440 23140 30060 14300 31580 10120 20190 26125 0.605
9 299369 49500 100960 23100 29970 13700 31820 9980 20120 26425 0.604
10 297395 48000 100640 23040 29970 13675 31680 9740 20090 26075 0.600
11 296237 42600 100640 22960 29790 13750 31520 9620 19950 25975 0.593
12 296426 49500 100400 23020 29700 14000 31500 9400 19890 26175 0.600
13 296350 55700 100640 23080 29700 13950 31480 9420 19880 26250 0.606
14 295750 58800 100000 23120 29070 14025 31460 9300 19780 26475 0.607
Table 4.3. Daily German Combat Power Values for Personnel and Weapon Type.
The last column shows the aggregate combat power of the Germans on each day. Notice
that the artillery combat power values do not change much.





1 507698 239600 56400 10140 28350 56075 143260 328140 64080 17600 1.451
2 498884 236700 54080 10020 28080 54175 137660 314540 61190 17800 1.413
3 489175 206400 52880 9800 27720 51150 132660 301540 57870 17000 1.346
4 481947 175400 51840 9540 27810 48075 129160 290740 55230 16425 1.286
5 470762 149500 51200 9160 27720 45925 124880 281020 52740 16300 1.229
6 460808 140600 50320 9260 27630 44375 1 19720 268980 50270 16250 1.188
7 453126 135100 50240 9240 27360 42450 115640 259280 48500 16200 1.157
8 433813 97700 49040 8640 27180 40700 109960 244900 45830 16100 1.073
9 423351 97800 48480 8480 26820 39775 107120 237020 44340 16100 1.049
10 415254 90700 48240 8360 26550 39675 104040 230840 42300 16075 1.022
11 419374 88300 48080 8340 26550 38475 101820 226020 41340 16075 1.014
12 416666 98500 48000 8340 26370 39275 98320 221860 39970 16100 1.013
13 415461 97800 48160 8340 26190 39350 98660 221580 39720 16125 1.011
14 413298 94800 47280 8180 25920 38550 98040 219340 38500 16125 1.000
Table 4.4. Daily Soviet Combat Power Values for Personnel and Weapon Type. The
last column shows the aggregate combat power of the Soviets on each day. The tank











1 655411 1451343 German Prepared 0.451
2 625650 1413129 German Prepared 0.442
3 611445 1346195 German Prepared 0.45
4 627694 1286167 German Prepared 0.488
5 613434 1229207 German Hasty 0.499
6 616504 1188213 German Hasty 0.518
7 615880 1157136 German Hasty 0.532
8 605665 1073863 Soviet Prepared 1.773
9 604944 1049286 Soviet Prepared 1.734
10 600305 1022034 German Hasty 0.587
11 593042 1014374 German Hasty 0.584
12 600011 1013401 German Hasty 0.592
13 606450 1011386 Soviet Prepared 1.667
14 607780 1000033 Soviet Prepared 1.645
Table 4.5. This Table Presents the Combat Power of Both Forces, Attacking Side,
Defenders Combat Posture, and Attackers Force Ratio. Notice that for each day the
Soviet combat power is significantly greater than the German combat power.
d. Casualty Rates
Casualty rates for the day's battle are computed from the ATLAS attrition
equations [Ref. 13] for the attacker and defender separately. These equations are:
Attackers casualty rate = a * (x/y )'a + ft (4.1)
Defenders casualty rate = b*(y/x)~e + a (4.2)
Where;
x = attackers combat power,
y = defenders combat power,
a, b, e, a, and /? depend on the combat posture. These variables are taken




A b a P d E
Fortified 0.03593 0.012 0.008 0.02407 0.9 0.899021312
Prepared 0.02781 0.012 0.008 0.01919 0.87 0.899021312
Hasty 0.022384 0.015 0.01 0.016616 0.95 0.929916219
Meeting 0.02 0.02 0.011 0.011 0.89 0.89166815
Withdrawal 0.015434 0.0085 0.006 0.004566 0.93 0.879364086
Delay 0.015434 0.006 0.004 0.004566 0.93 0.778385397
Disorganized
Retirement
0.015434 0.012 0.008 0.004566 0.93 0.899021312
Rout 0.015434 0.015 0.01 0.004566 0.93 0.929916219
Holding - - 0.009 0.009









1 German 0.0472 0.0139 0.0472 0.0139
2 German 0.0472 0.0138 0.0472 0.0138
3 German 0.0472 0.0139 0.0472 0.0139
4 German 0.0472 0.0143 0.0472 0.0143
5 German 0.0392 0.0179 0.0392 0.0179
6 German 0.0391 0.0181 0.0391 0.0181
7 German 0.0391 0.0183 0.0391 0.0183
8 Soviet 0.0469 0.0281 0.0281 0.0469
9 Soviet 0.0469 0.0277 0.0277 0.0469
10 German 0.0391 0.0191 0.0391 0.0191
11 German 0.0391 0.0191 0.0391 0.0191
12 German 0.0391 0.0192 0.0391 0.0192
13 Soviet 0.0469 0.0270 0.0270 0.0469
14 Soviet 0.0469 0.0268 0.0268 0.0469
Table 4.7. Estimated Attacker Combat Power Casualty Rates are Always Higher than
the Defenders. For the first five days casualty rates are very close for both sides. The
Soviets have nearly the same estimated casualty rate for the days they attack. Likewise,
the Germans have consistent estimated casualty rates on the days they defend.
Table 4.7 presents the estimated combat power casualty rates for the
attacker and the defender. The attacker always has a higher casualty rate than the
defenders. For the first five days of the battle, combat power casualty rates remain fairly
constant for both sides.
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The only variables that might be changed are the combat posture and the
force ratio in the equations. The force ratios in this model are very close to each other
except for the days on which the Soviets attack, since there are only two different
engagement types. These facts cause the estimated casualty rates not to vary very much.
After computing the combat casualty rates, the issue is how to allocate
them to the different weapon groups, or in other words, how to define the personnel
casualties, APC, artillery and tank losses. This process is addressed in the following
section.
e. Distribution of Combat Power Casualty Rates
One of the problems with traditional force ratio models is that the loss
rates in each category of weapon are the same as the combat power casualty rate. Without
KV scoreboard, the ATLAS algorithm has no direct way to allocate casualties to the
different systems. Historical facts or the results from the higher-resolution combat models
tell us that different systems suffer different casualty rates.
From the historical facts, it is clear that the loss rates of tanks tend to be
higher than the artillery [Ref. 3]. In the ATLAS attrition structure, a process for the
allocation of combat casualty rate to weapon categories is not implemented. In order to
determine the weapon loss rates, we use linear regression analysis. We choosed the
regression analysis as the best way to distribute casualty rates to the different weapon
systems to allow comparisons between ATLAS and other models (SFS and QJM) that
explicitly distribute casualties to systems. That is, we are using the actual data to do what
the KV scoreboards would do. Consequently, the ATLAS fits artificially well for weapon
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losses. Figures 4.1a shows the German personnel loss percentages versus combat power















Figure 4.1a. The German Combat Power Casualty Percentages Versus Tank Loss
Percentages.
From Figure 4.1a, it can be seen that the pairwise relationship between the
German combat power losses and tank losses are positively correlated with a couple
outline points. These are the points in which the peak German tank losses occurred. These
days are the 2
nd
and 3rd days of the battle, during which the Germans hit the fortified
Soviet defense at the very beginning of the campaign. Figure 4.1b shows that the Soviet
combat power losses and personnel losses have a stronger linear trend. The other pairs of







Figure 4.1b. The Soviet Combat Power Casualty Percentages Versus Personnel Loss
Percentages.
For 14 days of the battle, we use the personnel casualty percentage as the
predictor variable and the weapon loss percentages as the response in fitting a linear
regression. This gives the least square estimates of the percent casualties of each weapon
categories as a multiplier of personnel casualties. Using the S-Plus software and linear
regression without an intercept, coefficient values are calculated for each of the weapon
categories. Tables 4.11 and 4.12 present the daily personnel casualties and weapon losses
of the Germans and Soviets.
Yi = $1 * Percent Personnel Casualties + error
Where;
Yi = Percent Casualties of type i weapon.
(3 1 = Coefficient to adjust weapon category percent casualties.
(4.3)
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The data presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 in Chapter DI.C.4 is used to fit
the linear regression for the German and Soviet sides separately. In the regression, the
data for the first day of the battle is dropped. It is clear from the low casualty level that
this day is a large outlier. This omission is supported by the historical facts and from the
previous studies of Clemens [Ref. 10: p.212], and Turkes [Ref. 11]. The Battle of Kursk
did not actually begin in earnest until July 5, 1943. Therefore, the models are fit only to
14 days of the battle. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present a brief summary of linear regression
results.
Categories Personnel Tank 4RTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
Coefficients 1.00 16.96 0.95 1.44 0.23 4.49 1.04 1.17 0.63 1.06
Pr(>|t|) - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 5e-4 le-3 le-4 9e-4
R-Squared - 0.83 0.78 0.71 0.10 0.88 0.62 0.55 0.71 0.58
F-statistic - 2e-6 le-6 6e-5 0.24 le-8 4e-4 le-3 5e-5 8e-4
Table 4.8. German Regression Results for All Combat Unit Data. Only the RKTL
weapons result is not significant.
Categories Personnel Tank 4RTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
Coefficients 1.00 7.09 0.81 1.11 0.38 1.82 1.52 1.66 1.93 0.34
Pr(>|t|) - 0.00 0.00 0.00 5e-4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
R-Squared - 0.89 0.77 0.82 0.61 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.27
F-statistic - le-7 le-5 3e-6 5e-4 le-6 5e-8 2e-9 2e-8 0.04
Table 4.9. Soviet Regression Results for Contact Combat Unit Data. The results are
not significant only for AA weapons.
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Regression results show that on average the Germans will lose 16.96% of
tanks, 0.95% of artillery, 1.44% of APC, 0.23% of rocket launchers, 4.49% of heavy
antitank weapons, 1.04% of mortar, 1.17% of light anti tank weapons, 0.63% of heavy
machine guns and 1.06% of air defense weapons for every 1% of personnel losses.
Likewise, the Soviets suffered 7.09% of tanks, 0.81% of artillery, 1.11%
of APC, 0.38% of rocket launchers, 1.82% of heavy anti tank weapons, 1.52% of mortar,
1.66% of light anti tank weapons, 1.93% of heavy machine guns and 0.34% of air defense
weapon losses for every 1% of personnel losses.
When the coefficients of the Germans and the Soviets are compared, it is
seen that they are not equal. The big difference is observed in tank losses. While the
Germans are losing 16.96% of their tanks for their 1% personnel losses, the Soviets will
suffer only 7.09% of their tanks for every 1% of their personnel losses. Also, the ATH,
Flame/MG, and AA coefficients are quite different. Since the two sides had different
mixes of weapons and attacked in different proportions we would not expect the
coefficients to be the same, however we can formally test this. In order to test if the losses
could be the same, i.e., the differences are explainable by simple random variation, a
regression analysis is done. The procedure used follows.
First, a new data set was built which combines the German and Soviet loss
percentages by weapon system (nine weapon categories). Now, the new data contains 28
points, 14 days from the Soviets and 14 days from the Germans. The regression formula
is constructed as:
Yi = |3l*Xl + (32*IG*Xl (4.4)
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Where;
Yi = Percent Casualties of type i weapon
Xl = Percent Personnel casualties
IG = Indicator variable. It is 1 for the Germans and zero for the Soviets
In order to test whether or not the Germans' and the Soviets' coefficients
are the same, a hypothesis test is done. The null hypothesis is H : (32 = 0, and the
alternative hypothesis is, H
a
: (32 * 0. The regression results from the S-Plus software are
presented in Table 4.10. The p-values of the coefficients from the results are used to test








Coefficient 7.09 0.81 1.1 0.38 1.82 1.51 1.66 1.93 0.34
Pr(>|t|) 0.0 0.0 0.0 le-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.016
Personnel:IG
Coefficient 9.9 0.14 0.32 -0.14 2.67 -0.46 -0.49 -1.30 0.71
Pr(>|t|) 0.0 0.55 0.31 0.5 0.0 0.13 0.12 2e-4 0.043
R2 - 0.86 0.77 0.79 0.45 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.41
F-statistic - 0.0 0.0 0.0 3e-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9e-4
Table 4.10. The Regression Results for the Hypothesis that the German and Soviet
Losses are the Same for the ACUD Data Set.
Our primary concern for the regression outputs is the p-values for the
indicator variable-Personnel :IG. The p-values for the tank, heavy antitank (ATH), and
Flame/MG weapon groups strongly suggest that H can be rejected at the significant level
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of 0.05. Thus, the German and the Soviet losses for these weapon groups are not the
same.
The p-values for the artillery, APC, RKTL, mortar, and ATL weapon
groups give support that H cannot be rejected. Thus, the German and Soviet losses for
these weapon groups may be the same. These results are for the ACUD data set. The
results are compared with the ones for the other data sets.
The casualty percentage relation between weapon categories and personnel
strength was determined. Now, the problem is using these ratios to distribute combat
casualty rates to weapon groups. Let,
X be personnel loss percentage,
Ri the regression coefficient of i type weapon category (i = 1, 2...n), and
CCR be combat casualty rate, then
£f?/* X =n*CCR (4.5)
Using the ATLAS curves and Equation 4.5 above, the personnel casualty
rate (X) is solved. Then, each weapon category loss rate is computed by multiplying the
personnel casualty rate (X) with their regression coefficient (R). This distributes the
casualties according to the regression while ensuring the CCR is as estimated by the
ATLAS curves. Personnel casualty rates and weapon loss rates are presented in Tables
4.11 and 4.12 for both forces. Note: this will provide a more accurate fit than the
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Firepower score algorithms would do in practice because they are tuned to the actual
results, rather than estimated by an algorithm.
Day Combat
Power
Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
1 4.72 1.63 27.59 1.55 2.34 0.39 7.31 1.71 1.91 1.03 1.73
2 4.72 1.63 27.59 1.55 2.34 0.39 7.31 1.71 1.91 1.03 1.73
3 4.72 1.63 27.59 1.55 2.34 0.39 7.31 1.71 1.91 1.03 1.73
4 4.72 1.63 27.58 1.55 2.34 0.39 7.31 1.71 1.91 1.03 1.73
5 3.92 1.35 22.90 1.29 1.94 0.32 6.07 1.42 1.58 0.85 1.43
6 3.91 1.35 22.89 1.29 1.94 0.32 6.07 1.42 1.58 0.85 1.43
7 3.91 1.35 22.89 1.29 1.94 0.32 6.07 1.42 1.58 0.85 1.43
8 2.81 0.97 16.42 0.93 1.39 0.23 4.35 1.02 1.14 0.61 1.03
9 2.77 0.95 16.19 0.91 1.37 0.23 4.29 1.00 1.12 0.60 1.01
10 3.91 1.35 22.88 1.29 1.94 0.32 6.06 1.41 1.58 0.85 1.43
11 3.91 1.35 22.88 1.29 1.94 0.32 6.06 1.41 1.58 0.85 1.43
12 3.91 1.35 22.88 1.29 1.94 0.32 6.06 1.41 1.58 0.85 1.43
13 2.70 0.93 15.79 0.89 1.34 0.22 4.19 0.98 1.09 0.59 0.99
14 2.68 0.92 15.66 0.88 1.33 0.22 4.15 0.97 1.08 0.58 0.98
Table 4.11. Estimated Daily German Loss Percentages. Due to rounding off, some
days seem to have the same rate. Note the high estimated tank losses.
/. Results
In this section, actual and estimated losses are compared for daily results.
The estimated combat power losses are done by ATLAS curves, and weapon loss rates
are calculated by ATLAS and our regression analysis. .The quality of the fits is presented
in the comparison figures. The figures are a good way to show the pattern of the fits. For
the purpose of comparing different models throughout this thesis, R 2 values are
computed, where i? 2 is given as:
R 2 =l- SSR
Z(Y-fy
= i-




Y and Y denote the estimated value, the real value and the mean value
of the Y parameter (daily casualties), which are indexed by days. A greater R 2 value
indicates a better fit. It is possible to get a negative R 2 value, implying that the fitted




Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
1 1.39 0.78 5.56 0.64 0.87 0.30 1.43 1.19 1.31 1.52 0.27
2 1.38 0.78 5.52 0.63 0.87 0.30 1.42 1.18 1.30 1.51 0.27
3 1.39 0.79 5.57 0.64 0.88 0.30 1.43 1.19 1.31 1.52 0.27
4 1.43 0.81 5.73 0.65 0.90 0.31 1.47 1.23 1.35 1.56 0.28
5 1.79 1.01 7.16 0.82 1.13 0.38 1.84 1.53 1.68 1.95 0.35
6 1.81 1.03 7.28 0.83 1.14 0.39 1.87 1.56 1.71 1.99 0.36
7 1.83 1.04 7.35 0.84 1.16 0.39 1.89 1.58 1.73 2.01 0.36
8 4.69 2.65 18.79 2.15 2.95 1.01 4.83 4.02 4.42 5.13 0.92
9 4.69 2.65 18.79 2.15 2.95 1.01 4.83 4.03 4.42 5.13 0.92
10 1.91 1.08 7.68 0.88 1.21 0.41 1.97 1.64 1.80 2.09 0.38
11 1.91 1.08 7.66 0.87 1.20 0.41 1.97 1.64 1.80 2.09 0.38
12 1.92 1.09 7.70 0.88 1.21 0.41 1.98 1.65 1.81 2.10 0.38
13 4.69 2.65 18.80 2.15 2.95 1.01 4.83 4.03 4.42 5.13 0.92
14 4.69 2.65 18.80 2.15 2.95 1.01 4.83 4.03 4.42 5.13 0.92
Table 4.12. Estimated Daily Soviet Loss Percentages. Due to rounding off, some days
seem to have the same rate. The Soviets have higher estimated casualty rates when they
attack.
Table 4.13 presents the R 2 values of the German and Soviet forces. Most
of the values are negative, but they are very close to zero. One poor day fit can cause a
negative R 2 value. It is better to use the figures and the R 2 values together. Figures give
a better insight into understanding the pattern of the fits. Throughout this thesis, only
combat power, personnel, and tank figures are given in the chapters.
As mentioned above, one concern with the R 2 values is that they are
sensitive to the outliers. For instance, if the model fits poor for one or two days of the
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battle, it can give a small R 2 value. Thus, in order to test that the model
under/overestimates the battle, a hypothesis test is done. Since the data consists of pairs,
actual and estimated values, our hypothesis is whether or not the difference between the
actual and estimated values is zero. The null hypothesis will be, H : /& = 0, and the
alternative hypothesis will be, H
a
: jlu> * 0. Here D is the difference between actual and
estimated values. Using S-Plus software, a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test for
all the German and Soviet weapon groups is done. Table 4.14 shows the p-values for this
test. Those p-values greater than 0.05 suggest that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
at the significant level of 0.05.
Weapon
groups




German -0.80 0.16 -0.63 -0.15 -0.11 -0.73 -0.43 -0.79 -0.41 -0.32 -0.01
Soviet -0.65 -0.19 -0.75 0.04 -0.91 -1.31 -1.72 -1.32 -1.69 -0.23 -0.71
Table 4.13. R 2 Values of Personnel Casualties and Weapon Losses. Tank R 2 value for
the Germans indicates a better fit.
Weapon
groups




German 9e-4 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.005 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.14 0.001
Soviet 0.21 0.32 0.32 0.85 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.46 0.11
Table 4.14. The p-Values from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for ACUD Data Set.
The non-significant values are highlighted.
There are only two positive R 2 values: the German tank and the Soviet
APC losses. The p-value for the Soviet APC losses supports the R 2 value and the model
fits this weapon group. Despite its positive R 2 value, the p-value of the German tank
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losses is small. The p-values for the Soviet losses show that the difference between the
actual and the estimated losses equal zero except for the Flame/MG and AA groups. For
the Germans, the difference between actual and estimated losses of the RKTL, ATL, and


















Estimated vs. Real German Combat Power Losses
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Figure 4.2. Fitted Versus Actual for German Combat Power Losses Applying the
ATLAS Attrition Process to All Combat Unit Data. The model overestimates casualties
on most days of the battle.
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12 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 4.3. Fitted Versus Actual for German Personnel Losses. The model
overestimates battle casualties except for the first day.
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Days
Figure 4.4. Fitted Versus Actual Tank Losses. The trend of the model is very
plausible. There is no significant outlier.
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Figure 4.5. Fitted Versus Actual for Soviet Combat Power Losses. The peak four
points are the days when the Soviets attack. The model mostly underestimates the battle,
with the last two days being a noticeable exception.
25000
20000
Estimated vs. Real Soviet Personnel Losses
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Figure 4.6. Fitted Versus Actual Soviet Personnel Losses. Except the last three days,
the model underestimates the battle. Day 8 is the bloodiest day of the battle.
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Figure 4.7. Fitted Versus Actual Soviet Tank Losses. The model underestimates battle
casualties except for the last three days. Again, day 8 is the heaviest tank battle in history.
Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show that ATLAS curves overestimate the losses
for the German forces. It is also true that the model overestimates the other weapon
losses not presented here. This fact is also supported by the signed rank test values
presented in Table 4.14. The resulting patterns in the figures are plausible for German
forces. It is clear that the Germans attack with a force ratio of less than one. In such cases,
the attacker is expected to take many more casualties than the defender. This might
explain the overestimation in the figures. According to the traditional "3:1" rule, the
Germans should not have attacked, but they did and the Soviets suffered more casualties.
One explanation might be the relative combat effectiveness. On the Eastern Fronts of the
two World Wars, the German relative combat effectiveness superiority over the Russians
was ranging between the factors of 2.0 and 3.0. [Ref. 3:p. 43]. The Germans have a
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higher relative combat effectiveness value, because they were well organized and more
professional than their opponents were [Ref. 3:p. 43]. In the ATLAS attrition process,
relative combat effectiveness is not considered explicitly.
Unlike the Germans, the Soviet's estimated losses were less than their
actual losses. Since they were mostly in defensive positions with a higher force ratio, it
was estimated that they would take fewer casualties. However, the fact is that they
suffered more losses. The only days in which Soviet casualties were overestimated were
the last three days. This is consistent with the fact that after day 9, the battle lost its
intensity. The ATLAS equations do not implement the battle intensity as a variable in the
attrition process. Thus, roughly the same percentage of casualties on day 8 and 14 were
estimated.
Other figures for all weapon groups for both sides can be obtained from
the author or his advisor.
3. The Application of the ATLAS Ground Attrition Method to Contact
Combat Units Data (CCUD)
The data used in Section 3 includes all unit data of those engaged or not engaged
directly in the combat. To investigate the influence of unit activities to attrition, the
ATLAS equations are applied to the contact and fighting unit data sets. Since the
Germans had a higher percentage in contact than the Soviets, this may help in adjusting
the over/underestimation of the models. This section will apply the ATLAS ground
attrition process to the contact combat units data (CCUD) set.
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a. Data
The formation of the data from the KOSAVE II report is presented in
Chapter IH, Section 4. The data, CCUD, used in this section was presented in Chapter
in.C.5. OH personnel and weapon strengths for both sides are shown in Tables 3.5 and
3.6 respectively. Personnel and weapon losses of the German and Soviet forces are
presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 respectively.
b. Combat Power and Force Ratio
The procedure, which is used in Chapter IV Section 2.b, is applied to
compute the combat power of the forces. The contact unit data is aggregated using the
same firepower score values, i.e., see Table 4.2. The new combat powers of the Soviets
and Germans, and the attacker's force ratio, are presented in Table 4.15. The same









1 590950 478989 German Prepared 1.234
2 595298 601831 German Prepared 0.989
3 582935 616078 German Prepared 0.946
4 579456 633302 German Prepared 0.915
5 567306 685975 German Hasty 0.827
6 543628 728815 German Hasty 0.746
7 585547 895732 German Hasty 0.654
8 579236 843193 Soviet Prepared 1.456
9 580117 840019 Soviet Prepared 1.448
10 573579 809195 German Hasty 0.709
11 582216 755686 German Hasty 0.770
12 584947 684744 German Hasty 1.171
13 507851 661533 Soviet Prepared 1.303
14 509223 687112 Soviet Prepared 0.741
Table 4.15. Estimated Daily German and Soviet Combat Power. Notice that the range
of force ratio is [0.63-1.45].
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Comparing the contact units force ratio with the all units' force rati*,
shows that the German force ratio increases while the Soviets force ratio decreases. This
is an expected result since the Germans had a higher percentage of units in contact for
most of the battle. It gives a higher force ratio for the Germans when they attack and
lower force ratio for the Soviets when they attack. The next sections will show how the
change in force ratio affects the quality of the fits.
c. Casualty Rates and its Distribution
ATLAS ground attrition equations, which are presented in Section 2.d as
Equations 4.1 and 4.2, are used to compute the estimated daily casualty rates. The same
combat postures are used in the equations as before. Table 4.16 shows the attackers,
defenders, the Germans and the Soviets daily combat casualty rates as estimated by the
ATLAS curves. Again, the attacker always has a higher casualty rate than the defender.
The Germans have greater estimated casualties during the first 4 days. The Soviets have
lower estimated casualties than the Germans except on the days on which they attack.
They have almost the same estimated casualty rates on the days they attack.
When the all unit and the contact unit estimated casualty rates are
compared, it is observed that estimated casualty rates of contact units data are lower than
the all unit data, except for the last two days for the Soviets. This can be explained by the
decrease in the Soviet combat forces, since they have a lower engagement percentage
when compared with the Germans. However, the pattern of the estimated casualties looks
similar. After having computed estimated casualty rates for both forces, the next issue is










1 German 0.047 0.022 0.047 0.022
2 German 0.047 0.020 0.047 0.020
3 German 0.047 0.019 0.047 0.019
4 German 0.047 0.019 0.047 0.019
5 German 0.039 0.023 0.039 0.023
6 German 0.039 0.021 0.039 0.021
7 German 0.039 0.020 0.039 0.020
8 Soviet 0.047 0.025 0.025 0.047
9 Soviet 0.047 0.025 0.025 0.047
10 German 0.039 0.021 0.039 0.021
11 German 0.039 0.022 0.039 0.022
12 German 0.039 0.023 0.039 0.023
13 Soviet 0.047 0.023 0.023 0.047
14 Soviet 0.047 0.024 0.024 0.047
Table 4.16. Attacker Casualty Rates are Always Higher than the Defenders. The
Soviets have lower estimated casualty rates than the Germans except on the days they
attack.
In order to distribute the estimated combat power casualties to different
weapon categories, the algorithm used in Section 4.2.d is also used here. The only
difference is, instead of all unit regression coefficients given in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, the
ones presented in Tables 4.17 and 4.18 are calculated using the contact units data. These
coefficients are almost the same as the ones computed using all unit data. Personnel
casualty rate and weapon loss rates are presented in Tables 4.20 and 4.21 for both forces.
Categories Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
Coefficients 1.00 15.02 0.85 1.38 0.23 4.23 1.06 1.11 0.59 1.05
Pr(>|t|) - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 6e-4 le-3 le-4 8e-4
R-Squared - 0.80 0.74 0.73 0.10 0.89 0.61 0.55 0.72 0.59
F-statistic - 5e-6 3e-5 4e-5 0.23 le-7 5e-4 le-3 6e-5 8e-4
Table 4.17. German Regression Results for Contact Combat Unit Data. The results are
not significant only for RKTL weapons.
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Categories Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
Coefficients 1.00 6.35 1.14 0.99 0.30 1.88 1.56 1.85 2.17 0.37
Pr(>|t|) - 0.00 0.00 0.00 2e-2 0.00 0.00 le-4 0.00 0.01
R-Squared - 0.83 0.73 0.83 0.34 0.83 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.40
F-statistic - 2e-6 5e-5 2e-6 2e-2 2e-6 le-8 7e-5 4e-8 0.01
Table 4. 18. Soviet Regression Results for Contact Combat Unit Data. The results are
not significant only for RKTL and AA weapon classes.
In order to test whether or not the German and the Soviet losses are the
same, a similar regression analysis to that presented in Section 4.2.e for the ACUD data
set is done. The only difference here is that the CCUD data set is used instead of the
ACUD data. Table 4.19 shows the results for the regression output for the CCUD data
set. Almost the same results with the ACUD data set occur except for the AA losses. The
p-value for the AA losses is greater than 0.05, which shows that the German and the
Soviet AA losses are the same for the CCUD data set.




Coefficient 6.35 1.14 0.99 0.30 1.89 1.56 1.86 2.1 0.37
Pr(>|t|) 0.0 0.0 0.0 3e-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.014
Personnel:IG
Coefficient 8.67 -0.1 0.38 -0.07 2.3 -0.5 -0.74 -1.6 0.68
Pr(>|t|) le-3 0.82 0.26 0.83 le-3 0.16 0.06 2e-3 0.06
R2 - 0.82 0.72 0.81 0.30 0.85 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.47
F-statistic - 0.0 0.0 0.0 9e-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2e-4
Table 4.19. The Regression Results for the Hypothesis that the German and the Soviet




Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
1 4.70 1.77 26.57 1.50 2.44 0.41 7.48 1.88 1.97 1.06 1.87
2 4.70 1.77 26.59 1.51 2.44 0.42 7.49 1.89 1.97 1.06 1.87
3 4.70 1.77 26.60 1.51 2.44 0.42 7.49 1.89 1.97 1.06 1.87
4 4.70 1.77 26.60 1.51 2.44 0.42 7.49 1.89 1.97 1.06 1.87
5 3.90 1.47 22.09 1.25 2.03 0.34 6.22 1.57 1.64 0.88 1.55
6 3.91 1.47 22.10 1.25 2.03 0.34 6.22 1.57 1.64 0.88 1.55
7 3.91 1.47 22.12 1.25 2.03 0.35 6.23 1.57 1.64 0.88 1.55
8 2.48 0.93 14.04 0.80 1.29 0.22 3.95 1.00 1.04 0.56 0.99
9 2.47 0.93 14.00 0.79 1.29 0.22 3.94 0.99 1.04 0.56 0.98
10 3.91 1.47 22.11 1.25 2.03 0.35 6.23 1.57 1.64 0.88 1.55
11 3.91 1.47 22.10 1.25 2.03 0.34 6.22 1.57 1.64 0.88 1.55
12 3.90 1.47 22.09 1.25 2.03 0.34 6.22 1.57 1.64 0.88 1.55
13 2.32 0.87 13.14 0.74 1.21 0.21 3.70 0.93 0.97 0.52 0.92
14 2.37 0.89 13.41 0.76 1.23 0.21 3.78 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.94
Table 4.20. Estimated Daily German Loss Percentages. Due to rounding off, some
days seem to have the same rate. A Large amount of tank losses is estimated.
Day Combat
Power
Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
1 2.25 1.28 8.10 1.46 1.27 0.39 2.40 1.99 2.37 2.77 0.48
2 1.99 1.13 7.16 1.29 1.12 0.34 2.12 1.76 2.10 2.45 0.42
3 1.94 1.10 6.99 1.26 1.10 0.33 2.07 1.72 2.05 2.39 0.41
4 1.91 1.08 6.87 1.23 1.08 0.33 2.04 1.69 2.01 2.35 0.40
5 2.26 1.28 8.13 1.46 1.28 0.39 2.41 2.00 2.38 2.78 0.48
6 2.14 1.21 7.72 1.39 1.21 0.37 2.29 1.89 2.26 2.64 0.45
7 2.01 1.14 7.24 1.30 1.14 0.35 2.15 1.78 2.12 2.48 0.42
8 4.69 2.66 16.90 3.04 2.65 0.81 5.01 4.15 4.94 5.78 0.99
9 4.69 2.66 16.90 3.04 2.65 0.81 5.01 4.15 4.94 5.78 0.99
10 2.09 1.18 7.53 1.35 1.18 0.36 2.23 1.85 2.20 2.57 0.44
11 2.18 1.23 7.84 1.41 1.23 0.37 2.32 1.92 2.29 2.68 0.46
12 2.30 1.30 8.27 1.49 1.30 0.39 2.45 2.03 2.42 2.83 0.49
13 4.69 2.66 16.91 3.04 2.65 0.81 5.01 4.15 4.95 5.78 0.99
14 4.69 2.66 16.91 3.04 2.65 0.81 5.01 4.15 4.95 5.78 0.99
Table 4.21. Estimated Daily Soviet Loss Percentages. Due to rounding off, some days




For the purpose of comparing actual and estimated casualties, R 2 values
and figures are used together. Table 4.22 presents the R 2 values for the Germans and
Soviets, with an R 2 = 1 being a perfect fit. Positive values for the tank and combat power
losses of the Germans occur as well as for the APC losses of the Soviets. Although it is
positive, the German combat power/? 2 value is very small. The Soviet combat power
R 2 value is still negative. Overall, R 2 values for both sides are better than the ones
computed in Section 4.2.e using the all combat unit data (ACUD). The results show that
the ATLAS ground attrition model and the regression method to distribute losses fit
better to the contact combat units than the all combat units data of the Battle of Kursk.
The model overestimates the German loses in the ACUD data set, while it underestimates
the Soviet losses. This over/underestimation is due to the lower German force ratio in the
ACUD data set. On the other hand, in CCUD data set, the Germans have higher force
ratios than the ACUD data set due to their higher percentage of units in contact. The
higher German force ratio results in lower casualty estimates for the Germans and higher
casualty estimates for the Soviets. As a result, the ATLAS curve fits better in the CCUD
data set. In the following pages, real versus estimated losses are plotted to give a better
understanding of the quality of the fits.
As in Chapter IV.2.f, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is done to test the
hypothesis whether or not the difference between actual and estimated losses are
statistically significant. The p-values of the tests are presented in Table 4.23. The
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difference between the actual and estimated losses for the German tank, APC, RKTL,
ATL, Flame/MG, and AA weapon groups is accepted to be zero at the significant level of
0.05. This result suggests that the model fit better for the CCUD data set than the ACUD
data set, which is also supported by the R 2 values. But this is not true for the Soviet








German -0.86 0.26 -0.70 -0.08 -0.13 -0.64 -0.59 -0.80 -0.42 -0.29 0.08
Soviet -0.33 -0.20 -0.45 0.08 -0.15 -0.78 -1.12 -0.92 -1.19 -0.26 -0.53
Table 4.22. R z Values of Personnel Casualties and Weapon Losses. Tank and combat
power values for the Germans and the APC value of the Soviets indicate a better fit.
Weapon
groups




German 0.004 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.2 0.06 0.2 0.001
Soviet 0.02 0.03 0.3 0.5 0.03 0.2 0.04 0.04 0.05 1 0.02
Table 4.23 The p-Values from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for CCUD Data Set.
The non-significant values are highlighted.
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Figure 4.8. Fitted Versus Actual for the German Combat Power Losses Applying
ATLAS Attrition Process to Contact Combat Unit Data. The model overestimates on
most days except for the second, fifth and eighth days
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Figure 4.9. Fitted Versus Actual for the German Personnel Losses. The model
overestimates battle casualties except for the first and eighth day.
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Figure 4.10. Fitted Versus Actual Tank Losses. The model catches the battle trend, but
overestimates battle casualties towards the end. There is no significant outlier.
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Figure 4. 1 1 . Fitted Versus Real for Soviet Combat Power Losses. The peak four points
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Figure 4.12. Fitted Versus Real the Soviet Personnel Losses. Except for the last two
days, the model underestimates battle casualties. Day 8 is the bloodiest day of the battle.
Estimated vs. Real Soviet Tank Losses
Actual Tank
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Figure 4.13. Fitted Versus Real Soviet Tank Losses. The model underestimates the
battle except for the last three days. Again, day 8 is the heaviest tank battle in history.
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Figures 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 show that this model overestimates the losses for the
German forces. The German combat power and the tank power fits are plausible, which
are supported by their R 2 values and p-values for the signed-rank test. These fits are
better than the ones done in Section 4.2.f using all units data (ACUD). The
overestimation for the last five days is because the battle lost its intensity during these
days.
Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 show that mostly the model underestimates the Soviet
casualty rates, except for the last two days. This is also supported by the p-values for the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test value. The overestimation of the last two days is consistent
with the German fits. The highest casualty rate, on day 8, can be explained by historical
facts. This particular day is the day that the bloodiest tank battle in history occurred.
In brief, the ATLAS ground attrition model fits to contact combat unit data better
than the data when all combat units are considered. The patterns in the fits are similar. R 2
values and p-values for the signed rank test are slightly better in contact units data.
The next section will apply this model to the fighting combat unit data. Later, all
of the results of these three data sets are compared.
4. The Application of the ATLAS Ground Attrition Method to Fighting
Combat Units Data (FCUD)
This section applies the ATLAS ground attrition process to the fighting combat
units data (FCUD) set.
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a. Data
The data, FCUD, used in this section was presented in Chapter m.C.6. OH
personnel and weapon strengths for both sides and are shown in Tables 3.9 and 3.10
respectively. Personnel and weapon losses of the German and Soviet forces are presented
in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 respectively. The data used in this Section includes all units
engaged and fighting with the enemy.
b. Combat Power and Force Ratio
The same procedure used in Section 2.b is applied to compute the combat
power of the forces. The FCUD is aggregated using the same firepower score values
presented in Table 4.2. The computed combat power of the Soviets and the Germans and
the attacker's force ratio are presented in Table 4.24. Also, the same combat postures are
used in these calculations.
The Germans force ratio for FCUD is greater than the ratios of ACUD and
CCUD. Unlike the Germans, the Soviets' FCUD force ratio is smaller than their ACUD
and CCUD force ratios. This can be explained by the ratio of the units in contact, and
fighting postures.
c. Casualty Rates and its Distribution
The ATLAS ground attrition equations, which are presented in Section 2.d
as Equations 4.1 and 4.2, are used to compute the daily estimated casualty rates. The
same combat postures as before are used in the equations. Table 4.25 shows the attacker,
defender, and the German's and Soviet's daily estimated combat casualty rates. Again,
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the attacker always has a higher estimated casualty rate than the defender. The Germans









1 567831 221788 German Prepared 2.560
2 568308 379859 German Prepared 1.496
3 469897 445913 German Prepared 1.054
4 491994 369410 German Prepared 1.332
5 457604 426502 German Hasty 1.073
6 461376 394151 German Hasty 1.171
7 507643 521923 German Hasty 0.973
8 554520 616904 Soviet Prepared 1.113
9 580117 450356 Soviet Prepared 0.776
10 438203 514760 German Hasty 0.851
11 465735 216818 German Hasty 2.148
12 258370 213639 German Hasty 0.827
13 320058 96956 Soviet Prepared 0.303
14 396179 306856 Soviet Prepared 1.291
Table 4.24. Estimated Daily the German and the Soviet Combat Power. Notice that the
range of force ratio is [0.30-2.56]. On the first day, the force ratio is very close to the 3-1
traditional attacker force ratio.
The Soviets have lower estimated casualty rates than the Germans except on the days they
attack. They have almost the same estimated casualty rates on the days they attack.
When the estimated FCUD casualty rates are compared to the estimated
ACUD and CCUD casualty rates, it is observed that the FCUD casualty rates are lower
than the other two data sets. After having computed casualty rates for both forces, the
next issue is to allocate them to different weapon categories.
In order to distribute the combat power casualties to different weapon
categories, the algorithm used in Section 4.2.d is also used here. The only difference is,
instead of ACUD regression coefficients given in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, the ones presented
in Tables 4.26 and Table 4.27 are used. These coefficients are almost the same as the ones
85










1 German 0.0468 0.0359 0.0468 0.0359
2 German 0.0469 0.0252 0.0469 0.0252
3 German 0.0470 0.0206 0.0470 0.0206
4 German 0.0469 0.0235 0.0469 0.0235
5 German 0.0390 0.0260 0.0390 0.0260
6 German 0.0390 0.0274 0.0390 0.0274
7 German 0.0390 0.0246 0.0390 0.0246
8 Soviet 0.0470 0.0212 0.0212 0.0470
9 Soviet 0.0471 0.0176 0.0176 0.0471
10 German 0.0390 0.0229 0.0390 0.0229
11 German 0.0388 0.0405 0.0388 0.0405
12 German 0.0390 0.0279 0.0390 0.0279
13 Soviet 0.0473 0.0121 0.0121 0.0473
14 Soviet 0.0471 0.0175 0.0175 0.0471
Table 4.25. Attacker's Estimated Casualty Rates are Always
Defenders. The Soviets have lower estimated casualty rates than the
the days they attack.
In order to test whether or not the German and the Soviet losses are the
Higher than the
Germans except for
same, again the regression analysis presented in Section 4.2.e for the FCUD data set is
done. The only difference here is that the FCUD data set is used instead of the ACUD
data. Table 4.28 shows the results for the regression output for the FCUD data set. The
same results occur with the ACUD data set. For the AA losses, it can be concluded that
the German and the Soviet losses are not the same, since the p-value is less than 0.05.
Categories Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
Coefficients 1.00 14.29 0.87 1.34 0.20 4.44 1.01 1.00 0.61 1.18
Pr(>|t|) - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 9e-4 7e-4 2e-4 6e-4
R-Squared - 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.07 0.89 0.58 0.60 0.66 0.60
F-statistic - 9e-6 le-5 le-5 0.32 le-7 8e-4 7e-4 2e-4 6e-4
Table 4.26. German Regression Results for Contact Combat Unit Data. The results are
not significant only for RKTL weapons.
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Categories Personnel Tank ARTY APC RKTL ATH MTR ATL Flame/
MG
AA
Coefficients 1.00 6.65 1.01 1.72 0.30 2.09 1.74 1.95 2.16 0.18
Pr(>|t|) - 0.00 le-4 le-3 5e-2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
R-Squared - 0.83 0.69 0.56 0.27 0.83 0.87 0.93 0.88 0.27
F-statistic - 2e-6 le-4 le-3 5e-2 2e-6 3e-7 5e-9 le-7 0.04
Table 4.27. Soviet Regression Results for Contact Combat Unit Data. The results are
not significant only for RKTL and AA weapon classes.




Coefficient 6.65 1.01 1.72 0.30 2.09 1.73 1.95 2.16 0.18
Pr(>|t|) 0.0 0.0 0.0 5e-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01
Personnel:IG
Coefficient 7.65 -0.15 -0.37 -0.1 2.35 -0.72 -0.95 -1.55 1
Pr(>|t|) 0.02 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.02 0.28 0.08 0.04 0.008
R2 - 0.82 0.70 0.60 0.26 0.84 0.86 0.92 0.88 0.4
F-statistic - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2e-4
Table 4.28. The Regression Results for the Hypothesis that the German and Soviet
Losses are the Same for the FCUD Data Set.
d. Results
Again, the R 2 values and the figures are used together to compare the
actual and estimated casualties. Table 4.29 presents the R 2 values for the Germans and
Soviets. The tank and the combat power R 2 values are greater than 0.50, which is a high
value for combat models. Also, positive values for the personnel, APC, ATH and the
Flame/MG losses of the Germans, and for APC losses of the Soviets occur. Overall, R 2
values for the Germans are better than the ones' computed using ACUD and CCUD. For
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the Soviets, the APC value is better than the previous ones, but there is no significant
difference for the personnel and other weapons. On the following pages, real versus
estimated losses are plotted to give a better understanding of the quality of the fits.
As in Sections 4.2.f and 4.3.d, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is done to test
the hypothesis of whether or not the difference between actual and estimated losses is the
same. The p-values of the tests are presented in Table 4.30. The difference between the
actual and estimated losses for the German tank, artillery, RKTL, ATH, ATL, Flame/MG,
and AA weapon groups are accepted as equal to zero at the significant level of 0.05. This
result suggests that the model fits better for the FCUD data set than the ACUD and
CCUD data sets. This is also supported by the R 2 values. The Soviet p-values for the
APC, RKTL, and the AA losses suggest that the model do not under/overestimates the
battle for these weapon groups. These results are also supported by the R 2 values.
Weapon
groups




German 0.16 0.54 -0.30 0.35 -0.13 0.05 -0.08 -0.79 0.00 -0.25 0.57
Soviet -0.73 -0.21 -0.39 0.40 -0.22 -0.81 -1.67 -1.18 -1.67 -0.18 -0.76
Table 4.29. R 2 Values of Personnel Casualties and Weapon Losses. Tank, personnel,
APC, ATH, Flame/MG, and combat power values for the Germans and the APC value
indicate a better fit. The APC losses fit better for both sides.
Weapon
groups




German 0.007 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.54 0.07 0.01 0.71 0.09 0.54 0.009
Soviet 0.009 0.009 0.02 0.27 0.18 0.02 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.35 0.0012
Table 4.30. The p-Values from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for the FCUD Data
Set. The non-significant values are highlighted.
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Figures 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 show that the ATLAS ground attrition model
overestimates the battle on most days for the German forces. The German combat power,
personnel and tank fits are plausible which are supported by high R 2 values. In these
categories, the model catches the general pattern of the battle for the Germans. These fits
are better than the fits of the ACUD and CCUD data sets. This suggestion is also
supported by the p-values for the signed rank test.
Figures 4.17, 4.18, and 4.19 show that the model underestimates the
Soviet casualties until the ninth day, which is supported by the signed rank test. It fits
better in the last four days of the battle. The pattern of the figures is similar to the
previous fits presented in earlier sections. The R 2 values and the p-values for the Soviets
are consistent.
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Figure 4. 14. Fitted Versus Actual for the German Combat Power Losses Applying
ATLAS Attrition Process to Fighting Combat Units Data. On days 2, 5, and 9, the model
fits the battle very well.
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Figure 4.15. Fitted Versus Actual for the German Personnel Losses. The model
overestimates battle casualties except for the first, eighth and the ninth days.
Estimated vs. Real German Tank Losses
Actual Tank
•Est.Tank
6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 4. 16. Fitted Versus Actual Tank Losses. The trend of the model is fairly good.
There is no significant outlier.
90








- Actual Combat Power
Est.Combat Power












Estimated vs. Real Soviet Personnel Losses
- Actual Personnel
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Days
Figure 4.18. Fitted Versus Real Soviet Personnel Losses. The model underestimates
battle casualties, but gives a better fit towards the end of the battle.
91
Estimated vs. Real Soviet Tank Losses
Actual Tank
Est.Tank
3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 4.19. Fitted Versus Real Soviet Tank Losses. The model underestimates battle
casualties until the ninth day and it fits the battle fairly well on the last four days.
5. The Application of the ATLAS Ground Attrition Method with Air
Sortie Data
In this section, air sortie data is added to the model to investigate whether or not it
improves the quality of the fits. Basically, the same procedure presented in Sections 2, 3,
and 4 is followed except air sorties are added to the Firepower scores.
a. Data
The KDB presents the Soviet and German air sortie activity during the
battle of Kursk. The KDB records a daily listing of the number of sorties generated for
each aircraft type/mission type combination [Ref. 14:p. 7-1]. The number of onhand
aircraft, armament delivered or specific targets attacked is not recorded comprehensively
in the KDB. Therefore, the KOSAVE study summarized total daily air sorties according
to armed combat roles (attack, bombing, or air-to-air) as well as unarmed roles
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(reconnaissance, evacuation). The attack role applies to air attack against specific tactical
targets, like contemporary close air support. The bombing role applies to attack against
less specific area targets similar to contemporary interdiction [Ref. 14:p. 7-1].
Figure 4.20 shows the total sorties generated in each role for both forces.
The Germans generated slightly more total sorties than the Soviets. The Germans
generated over twice as many ground attack sorties as the Soviets. There were 1400
German evacuation sorties, but none for the Soviets.
In this study, bombing and ground attack air sorties are included in the
models to investigate whether or not adding the air sorties improves the quality of the fits.
It is clear that the air sorties affect the attrition in battle. Specifically, the data is for the
ground attack air sorties, which provide close fire support to the line units. Table 4.31




































Figure 4.20. Total Sorties in Each Aircraft Role.
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Day GERMAN SOVIET
GND ATTACK BOMBING GND ATTACK BOMBING
1 1406 536 354 246
2 1033 323 217 396
3 946 553 146 515
4 887 539 388 281
5 882 404 291 181
6 396 134 158 225
7 604 205 152 196
8 398 62 272 331
9 342 109 257 366
10 645 502 124 580
11 259 282 122 247
12 248 30 181 500
13 69 53 159 177
14 18 94 190
Table 4.3 1. The Daily Number of Ground Attack and Bombing Air Sorties for Both
Sides. The Germans generated more ground attacks during the first two days.
The three data sets presented in Chapter III and used in Sections 2, 3, and
4 are also used here. Thus, personnel and weapon numbers do not change. Only the air
sortie data shown in Table 4.31 is added to these three data sets. No classification is made
for air sortie data, i.e., contact or fighting air sorties.
b. Combat Power
As presented in Table 4.1, attack helicopters have an average firepower
score value of 7. Although helicopters were not used in World War II, they are the only
air vehicles that firepower score values are assigned to in RAND's proposed ground force
scoring system. Firepower score values for the ground attack and bombing air sorties
relative to RAND's scores for the attack helicopters were assigned. Thus, ground attack
air sorties have the score value of 150, and the bombing air sorties have the firepower
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score value of 120. Firepower score values of all weapons used in this section are
presented in Table 4.32. Combat powers and force ratios are computed with the same
methods described in Sections 2.c and 2.d.
Weapon
Groups








1 100 20 80 90 25 20 20 10 25 150 120
Table 4.32. Firepower Score Values for 1 1 Weapon Groups. These scores are
computed relative to RAND's firepower score values.
c. Casualty Rates and its Distribution
Again, ATLAS ground attrition equations (Equations 4.1 and 4.2) are used
to compute the daily casualty rates. The same procedure is followed to distribute the
combat power casualty rates to weapon categories. The only difference is that air sortie
data is not used in the casualty distribution. Since KV scoreboards are not available in the
database, we do not know the ground casualties due to the air sorties. The air sortie data
is included only in the computation of the aggregated combat power of the forces.
d. Results
Figures and R 2 values are used to compare the actual and estimated
casualties. Table 4.33 presents the R 2 values for the Soviets and Germans. In the ACUD
data set, positive values for the Soviet tank and APC values and for the German tank and
combat power values occur. In this data set, adding the air sorties to the model improves
the quality of the fits. In the CCUD data set, Soviet APC, German tank, APC, and combat
power values are positive. Again, adding the air sorties gives better R 2 values also for
this data set. In the FCUD data set, the German personnel, tank, APC, ATH, Flame/MG
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and combat power, and Soviet APC R 2 values are positive. The R 2 values are better
the ones computed without air sortie data
According to the R 2 values for both sides in all data sets, adding the a
sorties to the ATLAS ground attrition model improves the quality of the fits. However,
the figures should be considered before making this conclusion.






GERMAN -0.62 0.24 -0.42 -0.05 -0.08 -0.44 -0.39 -0.25 -0.30 -0.11 0.11
SOVIET -0.24 0.03 -0.47 0.14 -0.42 -0.73 -0.82 -0.63 -0.75 -0.19 -0.23
CCUD
GERMAN -0.67 0.33 -0.46 0.01 -0.09 -0.39 -0.54 -0.25 -0.27 -0.09 0.21
SOVIET -0.26 -0.15 -0.40 0.10 -0.13 -0.68 -1.01 -0.81 -1.07 -0.24 -0.44
FCUD
GERMAN 0.23 0.58 -0.15 0.40 -0.10 0.17 -0.06 -0.28 0.06 -0.06 0.62
SOVIET -0.40 -0.08 -0.26 0.46 -0.15 -0.51 -0.98 -0.70 -1.00 -0.14 -0.42
Table 4.33. R 2 Values for both Sides in Different Data Sets with Air Sorties. The APC
values are almost positive in all models for both sides. The only positive personnel value
is seen for the Germans in the FCUD data set. The German combat power values are











9E-4 5E-3 0.02 0.02 0.05 5E-3 0.02 0.34 0.02 0.14 1E-3
Soviet 0.21 0.46 0.32 0.90 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.1 0.05 0.42 0.12
CCUD
German
9E-4 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.6 7E-3 0.02 0.5 0.03 0.24 7E-3
Soviet 0.03 0.04 0.30 0.62 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.9 0.03
FCUD
German
5E-3 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.5 0.07 0.01 0.67 0.09 0.54 8E-3
Soviet 6E-4 8E-3 0.02 0.32 0.2 0.02 2E-3 2E-3 1E-3 0.35 1E-3
Table 4.34. The p-Values from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for all Data Sets for
Both Sides. The non-significant values are highlighted.
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Figures 4.21 and 4.22 show the estimated versus actual combat power
losses in the FCUD data set for the Germans and Soviets. When comparing these figures
with the ones presented in Figures 4.8 and 4.11, which show the fits without air sortie
data, it is seen that patterns of the curves are exactly the same. Although, the air sorties
improve the quality of the R 2 values, they do not improve the quality of the curves
significantly. This is true for personnel and all weapon groups in all data sets.
As in previous models, a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test is
done to test the hypothesis of whether or not the difference between actual and estimated
losses is the same. The p-values of the tests are presented in Table 4.34. The difference
between the actual and estimated losses for the German RKTL, ATL, and AA weapon
groups are accepted as equal to zero at the significant level of 0.05 for all three of the data
sets. In the FCUD data set, the German tank, artillery, RKTL, ATH, ATL, Flame/MG,
and AA weapon groups have a greater p-value than the significant level. This result
suggests that the model fits better for the Germans for the FCUD data set than the ACUD
and CCUD data sets, which is also supported by the R 2 values.
The difference between actual and estimated losses for all Soviet weapon
groups is equal zero at the significant level of 0.05 in the ACUD data set. In the CCUD
data set, the Soviet artillery, APC, RKTL, ATH, Flame/MG, and AA weapon groups have
a greater p-value than the significant level. The Soviet p-values for the APC, RKTL, and














Estimated vs. Real German Combat Power Losses
- Real Combat Power
Est. Combat Power
10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 4.21. Fitted Versus Actual for the German Combat Power Losses with Air
Sorties in the FCUD Data Set. The figure has the same pattern as Figure 4.2. The model's















Estimated vs. Real Soviet Combat Power Losses
Real Combat Power
Est. Combat Power
Figure 4.22. Fitted Versus Actual Soviet Combat Power Losses with Air Sorties in the
FCUD Data Set. The figure has the same pattern as Figure 4.5. The model underestimates
battle casualties.
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6. The Application of the ATLAS Ground Attrition Method Using
Different Firepower Score Values
In this section, different firepower score values are used in the models. Bracken
[Ref. 8] used firepower score values (in his study they are called weight) in aggregation of
the total forces in his study. He used personnel strength, APCs, tanks, and artillery in his
models and they are weighted by 1, 5, 40, and 20 respectively. Bracken [Ref. 8] states in
his study that, "The weights given above are consistent with those of studies and models
of the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency. Virtually all theater-level dynamic combat
simulation models incorporate similar weights, either as inputs or as decision parameters
computed as the simulation progresses."
According to Bracken's weights, an artillery piece is twice as valuable as a tank.
The tank, APC, and artillery score values were assigned the same as Bracken's. For other
weapon's firepower score values, RAND's values were used. See Table 4.1 as a
reference. Since Bracken did not use other weapon groups in his study, the weapons'
weights are the same as the ones used in previous sections. In Table 4.1, APC, MTR,
ATL have the same score (i.e., 20). In Table 4.35, APC has a score of 5 from Bracken's
weights, so MTR and ATL have the same score value of 5. The ATH, AA, and
Flame/MG scores are assigned according to the proportion of APC value in Table 4.1.
The RKTL score is given relative to the artillery value. In Table 4.32, the ground attack
score is 50% greater than the highest weapon score, which is tank in our scores and was
used in previous sections. In Bracken's weights, the artillery has the highest score value.
Therefore, the ground attack score value was assigned relative to the artillery score.
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Bombing score values are defined relative to the ground attack value as in Table
Table 4.35 shows the firepower score values used in this section.
Weapon
Groups






1 20 5 40 50 8 5 5 2.5 8 6
Table 4.35. Firepower Score Values for 1 1 Weapon Groups. Tank, APC, and Artillery
Values are from Bracken's Study. Others are computed relative to RAND's values.
The data used in this section is the same as that of the previous section, and air
sorties are also included. These weights are applied to the three data sets: ACUD, CCUD,
and FCUD. The same procedures are used to compute the combat power, force ratios,
casualty rates and to distribute the casualty rates into different weapon groups. Table 4.36
shows the R 2 values for both forces in three data sets. When these results are compared
with the results given in Table 4.33, Bracken's weights do not give a better fit except for











GERMAN -0.76 0.18 -0.66 -0.15 -0.13 -0.69 -0.42 -0.81 -0.39 -0.26 -0.28
SOVIET -0.50 -0.08 -0.62 0.09 -0.82 -1.06 -1.39 -1.03 -1.32 -0.20 -0.57
CCUD
GERMAN -0.81 0.28 -0.71 -0.04 -0.14 -0.64 -0.55 -0.86 -0.38 -0.32 -0.24
SOVIET -0.21 -0.12 -0.38 0.10 -0.12 -0.64 -0.92 -0.74 -0.99 -0.23 -0.34
FCUD
GERMAN 0.16 0.53 -0.32 0.36 -0.14 0.03 -0.07 -0.85 0.00 -0.27 0.45
SOVIET -0.63 -0.14 -0.34 0.44 -0.19 -0.70 -1.50 -1.04 -1.50 -0.16 -0.71
Table 4.36. R 2 Values for Both Sides in Different Data Sets with Air Sorties Using
Bracken's Weights.
Figures 4.23 and 4.24 show the estimated versus actual combat power losses in
the CCUD data set for the Germans and Soviets. Comparing these figures with Figures
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4.21 and 4.22, it is clear that using different weights do not change the pattern of the fits
significantly. The only remarkable difference is on the ninth day. On this day, for the
Germans, the model overestimates the battle, while there is a better fit for the Soviets.
Again, the p-values of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are presented for the null hypothesis
that the difference between the actual and estimated losses is equal to zero. The results











6E-4 5E-3 0.04 0.02 0.6 5E-3 0.02 0.4 0.02 0.15 6e-4
Soviet 0.17 0.54 0.26 0.95 0.03 0.1 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.4 0.2
CCUD
German
7E-3 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.21 9e-4
Soviet 0.03 0.06 0.3 0.6 0.08 0.24 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.9 0.04
FCUD
German
9E-3 0.07 0.21 0.03 0.5 0.09 0.01 0.7 0.09 0.5 5E-3
Soviet 1E-3 0.01 0.02 0.32 0.22 0.03 2E-3 3E-3 1E-3 0.4 1E-3
Table 4.37. The p-Values from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for all Data Sets for
Both Sides. The significant values are highlighted.
The difference between actual and estimated losses for the German RKTL
and AA weapon groups equals zero at the significant level of 0.05 for all of the three data
sets. In the ACUD data set, the German tank, APC, RKTL, ATL, Flame/MG, and AA
weapon groups have a greater p-value than the significant level. For the FCUD data set,
most of the German weapon groups have greater p-values than the significant level.
The difference between actual and estimated losses for most of the Soviet
weapon groups equals zero at the significant level of 0.05 in the ACUD and CCUD data
101
sets. In the FCUD data set, only the Soviet artillery, APC, RKTL, and AA weapon groups
have a p-value greater than the significant level.
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Figure 4.23. Estimated Versus Actual German Combat Power Losses with Air Sorties
Using Bracken's Weights for the FCUD Data Set. The model overestimates battle
casualties specifically after the 8
th day of the battle.
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Figure 4.24 Estimated Versus Actual Soviet Combat Power Losses with Air Sorties
Using Bracken's Weights for the FCUD Data Set. The model underestimates most of the
battle except for the last four days.
B. APPLICATION OF RAND'S SITUATIONAL FORCE SCORING
METHODOLOGY
In this section, RAND's situational force scoring (SFS) methodology [Ref. 7] is
applied to the data on the Battle of Kursk. Patrick Allen presented the SFS methodology
in 1991 as an initial attempt to describe a framework for situational adjustments to
ground force scores.
In combat in the real world, different types of weapons perform better or worse in
different types of terrain and engagements. Furthermore, each weapon type is more or less
effective depending upon the mix of weapons of both sides' forces. The SFS
methodology defines a series of multipliers that can be applied to any existing force
scoring mechanisms. One of the objectives of this method is to improve the
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representation of ground force close combat in aggregate combat models that use scores
of one form or another to compute force ratio, attrition, and movement as a result of
combat. SFS seeks to accomplish this objective by adjusting the scores, i.e., weapon
system values, dynamically to reflect the effects of the type of terrain, type of battle, and
combined arms imbalances or shortages on each side's effective force scores [Ref. 7j.
The SFS consists of a 20-step calculation process divided into four stages that
adjust force scores for a variety of factors. All of the steps require simple calculations,
such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. The four stages are defined in
the study as:
• Varying the strength of each category of weapon as a function of the
terrain and type of engagement
• Modifying category multipliers to account for shortages in the combined
arms mix
• Calculating combat outcomes, including losses to each side and the FLOT
(forward line of own troops) movement rate
• Calculating the casualty distribution across each category of weapon.
In this study, the SFS methodology is applied to our data sets by following the 20
steps presented in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 of RAND's notes [Ref. 7:pp.9-10]. Although,
the method needs simple calculations, the hard part is to determine the values of the
multipliers used in the computations. All the details of the calculations will not be
discussed, but the necessary information will be provided for future analyses.
First, all combat units data (ACUD) is used in the computations and the steps will
be explained in this data set. Later, the results are presented for both contact combat unit
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data (CCUD) and fighting combat unit data (FCUD). The application of SFS method will
be presented in four stages as mentioned in the RAND's note [Ref. 7].
1. Varying Asset Strength
This section presents the first seven steps of the algorithm described in Table
2.1 [Ref. 7:p. 9]. The SFS method starts with the number of assets in each weapon
category in the force, and three multipliers are applied to obtain the situational strength of
each weapon category as a function of the combat situation.
The first multiplier is used in Step 2 [Ref. 7:p.l5j for scoring assets. The SFS
methodology assumes the use of an existing scoring methodology that already defines a
relative value between combat assets. As mentioned in Section A.l, RAND's proposed
scoring methodology was used [Ref. 7:Appendix E] as a baseline for our firepower score
values. Again, the same firepower score values given in Table 4.2 are used herein. The 10
weapon categories used in Section A are aggregated by these firepower score values into
6 categories. Air defense weapons (AA) are not used. The categories are as follows:
• Tanks: tanks
• APC: APC
• Long-range anti-armor (LR atgms.) weapons: Heavy antitank weapons
(ATH)
• Short-range anti-armor (SR atgms.) weapons: Light antitank weapons
(ATL)
• Infantry: Personnel, mortar, Flame/MG
• Artillery: Artillery, rocket launchers (RKTL)
The second multiplier, force score multiplier, is defined in Step 4 [Ref. 7:p.l6].
This multiplier is used to account for some of the more qualitative factors that influence
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combat effectiveness. Some of these factors include the effects of the unit's level of
training, cohesiveness, or nationality [Ref. 7:p.l6]. On the Eastern Fronts of the two
World Wars, the German relative combat effectiveness superiority over the Russians
generally ranged between the factors of 2.0 and 3.0. [Ref. 3: p.43]. The upper limit 3 was
used for this multiplier for the Germans, because in Turkes's fits [Ref. 11] of the square
law, he estimated the Germans were 3.4 times as effective per man as the Soviets.
The third multiplier is the situational category multiplier, which is defined in Step
6 [Ref. 7:p.l7]. Two look-up tables were developed in the SFS methodology shown in
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 [Ref. 7:p.l8-19]. One is for the attacker and one for the defender.
Given the type of battle and the type of terrain, weapon category multipliers are
determined from these look-up tables. For the type of battle, the same combat postures
defined in Section B were used. The data used in this study includes the units in the
southern front of the battle. Since, all units in this sector were aggregated, it is not easy to
determine the type of terrain in the battle. For this reason, the mix type of terrain was
used in this method.
The result of this stage is the situational category strength contributed by each
category weapon as a function of terrain and type of battle, before any combined arms
shortages are calculated.
2. Determining Shortage Category Multipliers
In this stage, shortage category multipliers are defined. The weapon categories
used in the first stage are mapped into the three combined arms branches: armor, infantry,
and artillery using Tables 4.1 and 4.2 [Ref. 7:pp.31-32]. After mapping the weapon
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categories, the next step is to determine whether or not there are any shortages as a
function of the combat situation. The procedure for determining whether or not a
shortage exists in a platform is described in RAND's note [Ref. 7:p.33].
Due to the unavailability of the necessary information in our data, it was not
possible to determine the shortage category multipliers. Therefore, in this step the value
of 1 was used for the shortage category multipliers, which indicates that they do not have
any effect on the calculations. Moreover, there is no evidence from the historical accounts
or the data that suggest a shortage or imbalance in the weapon groups for both the
Germans and the Soviets.
The result of this stage on the final category strength is the same with the
situational category strength computed at the end of the previous stage.
3. Combat Assessment
In this stage the force ratio is computed. The force ratio, or the "situationally
adjusted" or "modified" force ratio (MFR), is the ratio of attacking force strength to
defending force strength. The force ratio and the type of battle together determine the
loss rates for each side and the FLOT movement rate [Ref. 7:p.39].
The first step in determining the loss and movement rates is to determine the
intensity of the attack. Three levels of intensity are defined in this methodology, which
are high, medium, and low. The intensity levels assigned to each day for the Battle of
Kursk are presented in Table 4.38.
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Once the intensity levels of the battle are defined, the casualty and FLOT
movement rates are computed by using the SFS equations [Ref. 7:p. 41]. Table 4.38
shows the force ratio, combat posture, battle intensity, attacker's preparation days and the
estimated combat power casualty rates for each side for the ACUD data set.
The German estimated combat casualty rates are very high during the first four
days due to their low force ratios on those days. The Soviet estimated combat casualty
rates on the eight and ninth days are very high due to their very low force ratios as an
attacker in those days. Also, on the last two days, the Soviet rates are high.
When the force ratio given in Table 4.38 is compared with the ones computed in
the ATLAS model (Table 4.5), the SFS force ratios are greater than the ones for ATLAS.
The interesting result is that the Soviet force ratios are four times lower than the ATLAS
ones on the days they attacked. This can be explained by the Relative Combat
Effectiveness of the Germans over the Soviets with a value of 3. In the ATLAS
algorithm, this factor is not implemented explicitly, so the Soviet force ratio on the days
they attack was greater than the Germans. The jump in the force ratio on the 4th day is
because of the decrease of the Soviet assets. After the 4th day, the German force ratio is
greater than 2. The first reason for this is the decrease in Soviet personnel onhand and
weapon numbers. The second and primary reason, is the change in combat posture type
from prepared to hasty. In real combat, it is not possible to predict the battle's intensity,
which is an important multiplier in the attrition, but in our model the battle intensity is


















1 German Prepared Medium more than 7 0.8786 0.1374 0.0262
2 German Prepared Medium more than 7 0.8563 0.1408 0.0258
3 German Prepared Medium more than 7 0.8753 0.1379 0.0262
4 German Prepared Medium more than 7 0.9362 0.1295 0.0273
5 German Hasty Medium more than 7 2.0979 0.0612 0.0458
6 German Hasty Medium 1 to 2 2.1861 0.0511 0.0353
7 German Hasty Medium 1 to 2 2.2441 0.0499 0.0359
8 Soviet Prepared High less than 1 0.4404 0.0164 0.3083
9 Soviet Prepared Medium 1 to 2 0.4308 0.0125 0.2316
10 German Hasty Low lto2 2.2180 0.0182 0.0107
11 German Hasty Low lto2 2.2042 0.0183 0.0106
12 German Hasty Low 1 to 2 2.2368 0.0180 0.0107
13 Soviet Prepared Low- lto2 0.4137 0.0037 0.0866
14 Soviet Prepared Low lto2 0.4082 0.0036 0.0876
Table 4.38. Force Ratio, Estimated Combat Casualty Rates for Each Side in ACUD
Data Set. Notice that for the first four days, the German estimated casualty rates are very
high. The Soviets have higher estimated casualty rates on the days they attacked.
The German estimated combat casualty rates are lower than the ATLAS ones
except for the first four days. Unlike the Germans, the Soviet estimated combat casualty
rates are higher than the ATLAS ones except for days 11 and 12.
4. Casualty Distribution
After the combat results have been assessed, the losses to each side are distributed
among the assets of each force. As mentioned in Section A, one of the problems with
traditional force-on-force models is that the casualty rates for each category of weapons
are the same as the overall combat casualty rates. From historical studies and a wide
range of higher-resolution games and simulations, it is clear that the loss rates tend to be
higher for armor assets and lower for artillery assets. In order to place this type of
information in a form useful for purposes of extrapolation, RAND estimated a category
loss multiplier for each category of weapons. [Ref. 7:p.44]
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These category loss multipliers are presented in Table 6.1 in RAND's notes [Ref.
7:p.46]. In this table, multipliers are defined according to a defender's combat posture
and battle's primary assault weapon (armor or infantry). The same combat posture for a
defender given in Table 4.38 was used. Since the Battle of Kursk was a major tank battle,
armor was used for the battle's primary assault weapon. Once the category loss
multipliers are determined, the combat power casualty rate given in Table 4.38 is
distributed to the armor, infantry, and artillery weapon categories. The results are given in
the following section.
5. Results
Although the SFS starts with different types of weapon categories, in the final
stage, the combat power casualty is distributed to only armor, artillery, and infantry
weapon groups. No category loss multipliers are defined for more specific weapon
groups, such as APC, mortar or antitank. As a result, the actual versus real armor,
infantry, and artillery losses were compared. These categories consist of the following
weapon groups:
• Armor: Tank, APC
• Infantry: Personnel, mortar, ATH, ATL, Flame/MG
• Artillery: Artillery, RKTL
Again R 2 values and comparison figures are used to show the results of this
algorithm. The R 2 values are shown in Table 4.39 for all of the data sets together. The
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test to test the hypothesis of whether or not the
difference between the actual and estimated losses is the same is also used in this method.
The p-values of the tests are presented in Table 4.40.
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The German armor R 2 value in ACUD, and combat power value in FCUD data
indicates a better fit. When the three data sets are compared, the SFS method fits the
FCUD data better than the other two data sets for both forces. Despite having broad
"tuning parameters," such as relative combat effectiveness factor, intensity, and the
number of day for attacker's preparation, the SFS does not give a good fit. The R 2 values
for the infantry and artillery groups specifically are very poor. The comparison of combat
power values to the ATLAS combat power values shows that the SFS did not fit the data
on the Battle of Kursk better than the ATLAS algorithm.
Data Sets Weapon Groups Armor Infantry Artillery Combat Power
ACUD
German 0.59 -180.40 -131.54 -13.45
Soviet -0.31 -48.15 -69.36 -16.82
CCUD
German 0.066 -32.47 -25.51 -0.51
Soviet -0.52 -48.85 -35.38 -17.76
FCUD
German -0.28 -7.79 -9.40 0.38
Soviet -0.04 -43.73 -28.09 -14.45
Table 4.39 R 2 Values for both Sides in the Three Data Sets. The value of German
armor in the ACUD data and the combat power value in FCUD data are very plausible.
Other values are very poor, mostly negative and very low.
Data Sets Weapon Groups Armor Infantry ARTY Combat Power
ACUD
German
0.24 2E-4 0.001 0.01
Soviet 0.21 0.3 0.03 0.95
CCUD
German
2E-4 6E-4 4E-3 0.11
Soviet 0.21 0.62 0.03 0.95
FCUD
German
1E-4 0.01 0.03 0.6
Soviet 0.17 0.95 0.10 0.90
Table 4.40. The p-Values from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for all Data Sets for
both Sides. The non-significant values are highlighted.
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Figure 4.25 shows that the model highly overestimates the first four days of the
battle for German combat power losses in the ACUD data. It gives a better fit after the
eight day of the battle. Overall, the p-value for its signed rank test shows that the
difference between actual losses is not zero. In the CCUD and FCUD data sets, the big
difference in the first four days gets smaller towards the end of the battle. Their signed
rank test p-values suggest that the difference between actual and estimated values is zero.
As a result, the model gives better combat power R 2 values in these data sets. Figures
4.26, 4.30 and 4.34 show the German armor losses comparison for the ACUD, CCUD,
and FCUD data sets respectively. The model fits better in the ACUD data set for the
armor losses, which is supported by its R 2 values and signed rank test p-values. The
model under/overestimates the battle for CCUD and FCUD data sets which is seen from
their signed rank test values. Overall, the model gives a good pattern for the armor losses
in all three data sets.
Figures 4.27, 4.31 and 4.35 shows that the Soviet combat power fits the data good
except for days 8, 9, 13 and 14 in which the Soviets have very low force ratios. Due to the
large differences on these days, the Soviet R 2 values are negative and very small. The
Wilcoxon signed-rank test p-values for the Soviet combat power losses are very high
which strongly suggest that the difference between actual and estimated losses is zero at
the significant level 0.05. These facts prove that the R 2 value by itself is not enough to
show the quality of the fits. Thus, the R 2 value, figures and signed rank test should be
considered together in comparison with the different models.
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The Soviet combat power losses show a consistent pattern in all data sets.
Likewise, the Soviet armor losses also have a consistent pattern in all data sets. They have
a better fit than the German combat power losses. In all data sets, the Soviet armor losses
have high p-values, which suggest that the real and estimated loss difference is zero. The
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Figure 4.25. Estimated Versus Actual German Combat Power Losses in the ACUD
Data. The model dramatically overestimates the casualties until the eight day. The high
overestimation during the first four days is due to the lower German force ratios.
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Figure 4.26. Estimated Versus Real German Armor Losses in the ACUD Data. The
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Figure 4.27. Estimated Versus Real Soviet Combat Power Losses in ACUD Data. The
model overestimates the battle on days 8, 9, 13 and 14. On the other days, on which the
Soviets were the defender, the general pattern is very plausible.
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Figure 4.28. Estimated Versus Real Soviet Armor Losses in the ACUD Data. The
model generally underestimates casualties, however it overestimates on days 8 and 9
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Figure 4.29. Estimated Versus Actual German Combat Power Losses in the CCUD













Estimated vs. Real German Armor Losses
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Figure 4.30. Estimated Versus Actual German Armor Losses in the CCUD Data.
Although the model highly overestimates the casualties on the first two days, the general
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Figure 4.31 Estimated Versus Real Soviet Combat Power Losses in the CCUD Data.
The model overestimates the battle on days 8, 9, 13 and 14. However, the model catches
the trend.
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Figure 4.32. Estimated Versus Real Soviet Armor Losses in the CCUD Data. Although
the model underestimates the casualties except for the days on which the Soviets
attacked, the overall pattern is very plausible.
Estimated vs. Real German Combat Power Losses
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Est. Combat Power
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Figure 4.33. Estimated Versus Actual German Combat Power Losses in the FCUD
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Figure 4.34. Estimated Versus Actual German Armor Losses in the FCUD Data. The














Estimated vs. Real Soviet Combat Power Losses
• Real Combat Power
Est. Combat Power
13 14
Figure 4.35. Estimated Versus Real Soviet Combat Power Losses in the FCUD Data.
The model overestimates the battle on days 8, 9, 13 and 14. On the other days, the overall
pattern is good.
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Figure 4.36. Estimated Versus Real Soviet Armor Losses in the FCUD Data. The
model fits well on the 8th day of the battle. Although the model underestimates the
casualties during the first days of the battle, the general pattern is good.
6. FLOT Movement Rates
As mentioned in Section 4, force ratio is also used to determine the FLOT
movement rates in RAND's model. In RAND's SFS study, the FLOT movement rate is
defined as a function of the type of battle and the relative attrition rates [Ref. 7:p42]. The
equations presented in the SFS method [Ref. 7:p.42] are used to calculate the estimated
FLOT movement rates. The only multiplier determined in the equations is FMR-Intens
[Ref. 7:p.42]. The FMR-Intens is a measure of the attacker's priority for movement in the
particular sector and not a measure of the overall battle intensity [Ref. 7:p.42]. The FMR-
Intens multiplier was assigned as follows: for the second day of the battle (5 July), it is
medium. For the 3rd , 4th and 5 th days it is high and for the rest of the days it is low.
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The KOSAVE study reports the average German progress in the northbound
advance of the campaign [Ref. 14:p.8-l]. In this study, it is stated that "northbound
advance is a suitable measure of progress because the primary German objective was a
northward advance toward Kursk." The average German progress is given in Table 4.41
[Ref. 14:Data98-7-worksheet Chapt8].




1.42 2.52 2.99 3.18 0.69 2.93 0.80 1.95 2.51 0.21 0.99 0.91 -0.24 0.34
Table 4.41 . Daily Average German Northbound Progress Increased Every Day Except
for the 13
th Day (17 July).
Since the FLOT movement rate is always in the direction of the attack, it is not
possible to compare the actual data to estimated rates on all days. Thus, the days in which
the Germans are defined as the defender were skipped. Also, the first day of the battle is
omitted, as in previous sections. Table 4.42 shows the days included in the model and the
estimated FEBA movement rates for all three data sets.
Data Day 5 July 6 7 8 9 10 11 14 15 16
RealFMR 1.42 2.52 2.99 3.18 0.69 2.93 0.80 0.21 0.99 0.91
ACUD Est FMR 2.29 3.30 3.42 3.80 1.35 1.24 1.29 1.06 1.05 1.07
CCUD EstFMR 10.76 11.49 10.68 9.95 2.94 2.18 1.77 1.44 1.60 1.88
FCUD Est FMR 36.20 22.09 12.93 18.41 4.47 4.80 2.82 1.90 7.97 3.22
Table 4.42. Estimated and Real FMR for the Germans. FMR denotes the FLOT
movement rate. The days are the actual dates of the battle.
The R 2 values of the estimated FLOT movement rates are 0.45, -24.10, and -
177.20 for the ACUD, CCUD, and FCUD data sets respectively. In other words, it fits all
combat units data fairly well, but other data sets very poorly.
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Figures 4.37, 4.38 and 4.39 show the estimated versus real German FLOT
movement rates for the days the German attacked for the ACUD, CCUD, and FCUD data
sets respectively. The model fits better in the ACUD data set. Also, its signed rank test p-
value indicates a good fit for the ACUD data set. The jR 2 value for the ACUD data set is
0.45, which is very plausible for combat models. The only poor fit is observed on the 6th
day of the battle. However, the general pattern is good for the ACUD data set.
The model fits poorly in the CCUD and FCUD data sets. This fact is also
supported by their R 2 values and very small signed rank test p-values.
Estimated vs. Real FLOT Movement Rates (in ACUD data)



















Figure 4.37. Estimated Versus Real FMR for the Germans in the ACUD Data Set. The
th
model fits fairly well except for the 6 day
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Estimated vs. Real FLOT Movement Rates (in CCUD data)
















Figure 4.38. Estimated Versus Real FMR for the Germans in the CCUD Data Set. The
model highly overestimates the battle during the first four days. However, towards the
end, the fit is fairly good.
Estimated vs. Real FLOT Movement Rates (in FCUD data)


















Figure 4.39. Estimated Versus Real FMR for the Germans in the FCUD Data Set. The
model overestimates the battle for each day. Again, during the first days, the
overestimation is very high.
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C. APPLICATION OF THE QUANTIFIED JUDGMENT MODEL (QJM)
METHODOLOGY
As a result of many years of research and effort, Colonel Trevor Dupuy, US Army
Retired, invented a new and revolutionary approach to the study of warfare [Ref.
22:p.xvii]. The approach is called the Quantified Judgment Method of Analysis (QJMA)
and the resulting model or simulation of combat, Quantified Judgment Model (QJM).
The basis for the QJM approach towards attrition is the experience derived from
the analysis of attrition in modern warfare [Ref. 23:p.l81]. In the QJM model, the basic
attrition calculation is for personnel losses. Losses for other weapon types and materials
are based on their historical relationship to personnel losses. The basic relationship to
determine the personnel loss rates is as follows [Ref. 23:p.l81]:
Personnel Loss Rate = (standard casualty rate) * (variable factors)
The standard casualty rate is the average casualty rate experienced for a particular
war or historical era. This value may be determined by historical analysis, or assumed for
future combat [Ref. 23:p.l81]. For the details of the standard casualty rate, see [Ref.
23:p.l81]and[Ref. 3:p.l05].
In this section, the QJM model is applied to the three data sets presented in the
earlier section. A similar format for presenting QJM as seen in the application of
RAND's algorithm will be followed. The basic equations will be provided, an
explanation for determining the variables factors will be given, the model will be applied
to the data and the results will be presented in figures.
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1. Personnel Attrition
As mentioned above, the model starts with determining personnel losses. The
personnel casualty equation is as follows:
C = .04(N * re * he * uc *tz * op * Su) * so (4.7)
where:
C: daily casualties incurred by then force
N: Personnel strength of the force
Re: Terrain factor for casualties
He: Weather factor for casualties





Lookup tables determine these factors. For more explanation of these factors, see
[Ref. 3:p. 105-106]. Possibly the most critical of the factors in Equation 4.7 is the
opposition factor. This is based upon the relative combat power of the opposing forces
[Ref. 3:p. 107]. In order to solve Equation 4.7, it is first necessary to determine the
opposition factor. It is also defined from lookup-tables, but it is then necessary to
compute the combat power ratio for each side. Combat power is represented by a simple
equation:
P = S * V * CEV (4.8)
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Where:
P: Combat power of a force
S: Force Strength (total firepower value, modified by circumstances of combat)
V: Variable factors applicable to combat circumstances
CEV: Relative Combat Effectiveness Value (with respect to the opponent's
effectiveness)
Equation 4.8 can be expanded as:
P = (N * so) * (m * u * r * h * Su) * (CEV) (4.9)
Where:
N: Personnel strength of a force






CEV: military effectiveness relative to opponent
Once Equation 4.9 is computed for both forces, the combat power ratio is
calculated. Then, using this ratio, the opposition factor is determined from the lookup
tables. After having determined the opposition factor, it is put into Equation 4.7 to solve
for the daily personnel casualties. Tables 4.43 and 4.44 show the values of the factors
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used in this study, and the combat power ratios for the Germans and Soviets respectively
in all three data sets.
Day So m u r h Su CEV
Pg/Ps
ACUD CCUD FCUD
1 1.3 1.2 1 3 1.98 4.83 9.77
2 1.3 1.2 1 3 1.99 4.17 6.17
3 1.3 1.2 1 3 2.01 3.83 4.32
4 1.3 1.2 1 3 2.13 3.59 5.21
5 1.3 1.2 1 3 2.52 3.95 4.88
6 1.3 1.2 1 3 2.56 3.26 4.70
7 1.3 1.2 1 3 2.58 3.05 4.14
8 1.3 1.2 1.4 3 4.51 5.31 6.81
9 1.3 1.2 1.4 3 4.63 5.40 10.46
10 1.3 1.2 1 3 2.79 3.27 3.94
11 1.3 1.2 1 3 2.75 3.76 9.81
12 1.3 1.2 1 3 2.77 4.15 5.86
13 1.3 1.2 1.4 3 4.67 5.89 25.80
14 1.3 1.2 1.4 3 4.69 5.46 1033
Table 4.43. Daily the German Combat Power and Factors Used in its Calculation. The
last three columns show the German combat power ratio for all three data sets. The Pg
and Ps denote the combat power of the Germans and Soviets respectively.
Day So m u r h Su CEV
Pg/Ps
ACUD CCUD FCUD
1 1.4 0.50 0.21 0.10
2 1.4 0.50 0.24 0.16
3 1.4 0.50 0.26 0.23
4 1.4 0.47 0.28 0.19
5 1.2 0.40 0.25 0.20
6 1.2 0.39 0.31 0.21
7 1.2 039 0.33 0.24
8 1 0.22 0.19 0.15
9 1 0.22 0.19 0.10
10 1.2 0.36 031 0.25
11 1.2 0.36 0.27 0.10
12 1.2 036 0.24 0.17
13 1 0.21 0.17 0.04
14 1 0.21 0.18 0.10
Table 4.44. Daily the Soviet Combat Power and Factors Used in its Calculation. The
last three columns show the Soviet combat power ratio for all three data sets. The Pg and
Ps denote the combat power of the Germans and Soviets respectively.
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Despite their lower personnel strength, the Germans have a higher combat power
ratio over the Soviets for each day in the ACUD data set. This reflects the effects of the
factors used in Equation 4.9. For all data sets, the German ratio is greater than the
Soviet's by a power of at least four. When the data sets are compared, it is clear that the
FCUD data set gives the highest combat power ratio in favor of the Germans. This can be
explained with the engagement percentages of the forces. While an average of 92
percentage of the German personnel strength is in contact with the enemy forces, the
Soviets had an average of 67 percent personnel strength in contact. The following
paragraphs explain how the factors were determined.
The purpose of the sophistication factor is to reflect approximately one or more of
the following [Ref. 3:p.l52]:
• More sophisticated weapons
• A higher proportion of crew served weapons, particularly artillery
• A higher proportion of close air support and battlefield interdiction
Since the Germans had higher close air support and slightly more sophisticated
weapons than the Soviets, the sophistication factor (so) is determined as 1.3 in favor of
the Germans.
The mobility factor is defined as 1 for both sides. The posture factor is determined
as in previous sections. Due to the difficulties explained in Section B, the terrain factor is
defined as 1, which does not affect the equations. Also, the weather factor was not used,
i.e., it is set as 1. The surprise factor (Su) is not used in the equations as both sides had
months of preparation. The CEV value of 3 was used in favor of the Germans. The reason
for this, as explained in Section B, is that on the Eastern Front, the German combat
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effectiveness superiority varied in both World Wars between 2.0 and 3.0 [Ref. 3:p.l08].
Although the upper limit (3) based on Turkes's research was selected [Ref. 11], further
analysis is required.
After having calculated combat power ratios for each side, the next issue is
determining the opposition factor from Table M [Ref. 3:p.l50]. The opposition factor is
put into Equation 4.7 with other factors, and personnel casualties are computed. Tables
4.45 and 4.46 present the factors used in Equation 4.7 for all data sets for the Germans
and Soviets respectively. Since the opposition factor depends on the combat power ratio,
it is given for all data sets. The next paragraph explains how factors are defined.
The terrain, posture, weather and surprise factors are defined the same as in the
computation for Equation 4.9. The sophistication factor is 1, which does not affect the
casualties for both forces. The opposition factor is defined from Table M [Ref. 3:p.l50]
using combat power ratios. The strength size factor recognizes that the smaller the force,
the higher the casualty rate. It is normalized to the size of a typical World War II division,
or 15,000 men, as shown in Table L [Ref. 3:p. 106-149]. Since our data is not at the
division level, and instead is aggregated for the whole sector, the smallest value for this
factor is used which is 0.3 for over 100,000 men. After daily personnel losses have been
calculated, Equation 4.10 computes the casualty rate, in percent for that day.
CR = C/N (4.10)
Where:
CR: casualty rate
C: daily casualties (from Equation 4.7)
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N: numerical strength of the force




1 1 0.3 0.75 0.5 0.4
2 1 0.3 0.75 0.55 0.4
3 1 0.3 0.75 0.6 0.55
4 1 0.3 0.75 0.6 0.45
5 1 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.5
6 1 0.3 0.65 0.6 0.5
7 1 0.3 0.65 0.6 0.55
8 0.85 0.3 0.65 0.45 0.4
9 0.85 0.3 0.5 0.45 0.4
10 1 0.3 0.65 0.6 0.6
11 1 0.3 0.65 0.6 0.4
12 1 0.3 0.65 0.55 0.45
13 0.85 0.3 0.5 0.45 0.4
14 0.85 0.3 0.5 0.45 0.4
Table 4.45. Daily the German Factors used in Equation 4.7.




1 0.85 0.3 1.35 1.7 2.3
2 0.85 0.3 1.35 1.7 1.9
3 0.85 0.3 1.35 1.6 1.7
4 0.85 0.3 1.35 1.6 1.8
5 0.9 0.3 1.45 1.6 1.7
6 0.9 0.3 1.45 1.5 1.7
7 0.9 0.3 1.45 1.5 1.7
8 1 0.3 1.7 1.8 2
9 1 0.3 1.7 1.8 2.5
10 0.9 0.3 1.45 1.5 1.6
11 0.9 0.3 1.45 1.6 2.3
12 0.9 0.3 1.45 1.7 1.8
13 1 0.3 1.7 1.9 2.5
14 1 0.3 1.7 1.8 2.5
Table 4.46. Daily the Soviet Factors Used in Equation 4.7.




The weapon losses are calculated based on personnel casualty rates computed in
the previous section. There are two equations in the QJM model to calculate the tank and
artillery losses. These equations will be presented in the following sections. Other
weapon losses are calculated according to personnel, tank and artillery losses. These are:
• APC: same as tank loss rate
• Antitank weapons: same as personnel casualty rate (CR)
• Infantry heavy weapons: 1.5 * CR
• Air defense Artillery: same as artillery losses
a. Tank Loss Rate
The simple equation for tank losses is [Ref. 3:p.l 12]:
DTLa = CR * CKT * NT * CEVd * tz * uc * Sui (4.1 1)
Where:
DTL: Daily tank loss
a: Attacker identifier
d: Defender identifier
CR: Personnel casualty loss
CKT: Standard tank loss rate; for the attacker this is 6; for the defender it
is 3
NT: Number of tanks
CEVo: Opponent's relative combat effectiveness
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tzi: Strength-size factor for tanks
Sui: Surprise attrition factor for the tanks
The CEV factor is defined as 3 in favor of the Germans. The strength-size
factor for tanks is determined from Table L [Ref. 3:p.l49] using the daily number of each
side. The surprise attrition factor for tanks is defined as 1. The CKT value is defined
according to combat posture except for 12 July. This is the day that a German
breakthrough attempt resulted in a major close quarters tank battle near the town of
Prokhorovka [Ref. 14:pp.2-3]. Thus, on this particular day, the CKT value of 6 is used
that shows both sides in an attacking position. These factors are presented in Tables 4.37
and 4.38.
b. Artillery Loss Rate
Artillery loss rates can be calculated by the following equation [Ref.
3:p.ll3]:
DALa = CR * CKA * NA * CEVd (4. 1 2)
Where:
DAL: Daily artillery loss in weapons
a: Attacker identifier
d: Defender identifier
CR: Personnel casualty rate
CKA: Standard artillery loss rate factor which is 0.30 for self-propelled
weapons and 0.1 for towed weapons
NA: Number of artillery weapons
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CEV: Relative combat effectiveness
The same CEV value of 3 was used again. Since the artillery was r
partitioned as self-propelled or towed, the average value of 2 was used for the CKA valu
in this study. Table 4.47 shows the factors used in Equations 4.11 and 4.12 for all data
sets. Since the tank strength size factor depends upon the number of tanks, it is













ACUD CCUD FCUD ACUD CCUD FCUD
1 12 6 3 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.8 0.91 1.2 0.2
2 12 6 3 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.8 0.83 0.86 0.2
3 12 6 3 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.8 0.86 0.86 0.2
4 12 6 3 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.2
5' 12 6 3 0.9 0.91 0.91 0.83 0.86 0.92 0.2
6 12 6 3 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.86 0.9 0.2
7 12 6 3 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.83 0.9 0.2
8 12 12 3 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.2
9 6 12 3 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.86 0.86 0.93 0.2
10 12 6 3 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.2
11 12 6 3 0.9 0.9 0.92 0.86 0.86 1.3 0.2
12 12 6 3 0.89 0.9 1 0.86 0.89 1.3 0.2
13 6 12 3 0.89 0.9 0.92 0.86 0.89 1 0.2
14 6 12 3 0.89 0.9 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.9 0.2
Table 4.47. The Values of the Factors Used in Equations 4. 1 1 and 4. 12 for all of the
Data Sets.
3. Results
In this section, all the results are presented for the QJM model. Again, the R 2
value and the comparison figures were used to show the quality of the fits. The personnel,
tank, artillery, APC, ATH, ATL, AA, and combat power losses of the Germans and
Soviets for all three data sets are computed and their R 2 values are presented in Table
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4.48. The non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test to test the hypothesis of whether or
not the difference between actual and estimated losses is the same is also used in this
method and presented in Table 4.49. The combat power represents only these weapon
types with the same firepower score values used in the previous sections.
Data
Set




0.31 -0.02 -1.74 -39.82 -1.81 -0.13 -1.31 -2.05 0.20
SOVIET
-27.72 -3.40 -119.52 -101.06 -336.34 -33.93 -198.77 -91.25 -2.49
CCUD
GERMAN
-0.19 -0.29 -1.97 -23.52 -1.82 -0.13 -1.85 -2.17 -0.25
SOVIET
-15.80 -1.23 -87.98 -66.41 -120.15 -16.34 -100.73 -13.67 -1.07
FCUD
GERMAN
-0.33 -0.48 -1.67 -11.54 -1.48 -0.01 -1.69 -1.96 -0.46
SOVIET
-14.61 -0.17 -87.48 -66.95 -83.99 -15.06 -76.55 -7.06 -0.76
Table 4.48. The R 2 Values for both Sides in the Three Data Sets.
Data
Set




0.95 0.02 0.0001 le-4 le-4 0.02 0.002 2e-4 0.04
SOVIET 0.5 le-4 0.09 0.62 0.003 0.07 0.002 0.11 0.02
CCUD
GERMAN
0.11 0.01 0.0001 le-4 le-4 0.07 6e-4 le-4 0.01
SOVIET 0.02 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.009 0.02 0.001 0.2 0.9
FCUD
GERMAN
0.01 0.002 le-4 le-4 le-4 0.02 2e-4 2e-4 0.002
SOVIET 0.002 0.04 0.005 0.01 4e-4 0.002 2e-4 0.17 0.21
Table 4.49. The p-Values from the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for all of the Data Sets
for both Sides. The significant values are highlighted.
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The positive R 2 values for the German personnel and combat power losses occ
The German personnel R 2 value is the best for all models in this study. The QJM moa
fits better for the Germans than the Soviets in all data sets. When comparing the data sets,
which are similar to the previous models, the Soviet R 2 values are better in the FCUD
data set than the ones in the other two data sets. This suggests that the classification of the
data improves the quality of the fits. Although, for the Germans, this result is not clear,
overall the model fits plausibly for the FCUD data set.
The comparison figures will be presented to provide better insight into the quality
of the fits. Again, the combat power, tank, and personnel losses are presented.
Estimated vs. Real German Combat Power Losses
- Actual Combat Power
Est.Combat Power
12 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 4.40. Estimated Versus Real German Combat Power Losses in the ACUD Data
Set. The model underestimates the battle for the first 5 days.
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Estimated vs. Real German Personnel Losses
Actual Personnel
Est.Personnel
10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 4.41. Estimated Versus Real German Personnel Losses in the ACUD Data Set.
The model underestimates the first 3 days, and overestimates the last 4 days. There is not
any significant outlier which is supported by its R 2 value. The general pattern of the











Estimated vs. Real German Tank Losses
- Actual Tank
Est. Tank
10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 4.42. Estimated Versus Actual German Tank Losses in the ACUD Data Set. On
most days, the model underestimates the battle. However, the general trend is good.
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Figure 4.43. Estimated Versus Actual Soviet Combat Power Losses in the ACUD Data
Set. Although, the model overestimates the battle on the 9th day and for the last two days,










10 11 12 13 14
Days
Figure 4.44. Estimated Versus Actual Soviet Personnel Losses in the ACUD Data Set.
The model mostly underestimates the battle except for the last four days. Overall, the
trend of the model is good.
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700
Estimated vs. Real Soviet Tank Losses
Actual Tank
Est. Tank
Figure 4.45. Estimated Versus Actual Soviet Tank Losses in the ACUD Data Set. The
model overestimates the battle during the whole campaign. It has a similar pattern with
the combat power figure.












- Actual Combat Power
Est.Combat Power
10 11 12 13 14
Figure 4.46. Estimated Versus Real German Combat Power Losses in the CCUD Data
Set. The model underestimates the battle for the first 5 days. It has the same pattern as the
one in the ACUD data set.
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Figure 4.47. Estimated Versus Actual Soviet Combat Power Losses in the CCUD Data
Set. The model overestimates the battle on the 9th day and for the last four days. Except














Estimated vs. Real German Combat Power Losses
- Actual Combat Power
Est.Combat Power
Figure 4.48. Estimated Versus Real German Combat Power Losses in the FCUD Data
Set. The model mostly underestimates the battle, but it gives a good fit towards the end.
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Figure 4.49. Estimated Versus Actual Soviet Combat Power Losses in the FCUD Data
th
Set. The model overestimates the battle on the 9 day and for the last two days. Overall,
the general pattern is not bad.
Figures 4.40 and 4.42 show that the QJM model mostly underestimates the
German combat power and tank losses for the ACUD data set. This result is also
supported by their signed rank test p-values that indicate that the difference between real
and estimated losses is not zero. As in all other models, the battle is overestimated on the
last days. This can be explained by the intensity of the battle which decreases after 12
July (8
th
day). Figure 4.41 presents the estimated versus real German personnel losses.
The model fits the German personnel losses best among all other models. This result is
apparent from its R 2 and signed rank test values.
Figure 4.46 shows the German combat power losses in the CCUD data. It has the
same pattern as the ACUD data (Figure 4.40). Its signed rank test p-value shows that the
model under/overestimates the battle. The same result is true for Figure 4.48, which
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presents the German combat power losses in the FCUD data set. The Germans have lower




and 14th which can be seen from the figures.
Figure 4.43 shows the Soviet combat power losses. The model
under/overestimates the battle. This is a similar pattern seen with the previous models
(see Figure 4.5). The estimated Soviet combat power losses (Figure 4.43) and personnel
losses (Figure 4.44) have different patterns. This suggests that combat power losses are
highly affected by the tank losses.
Figure 4.42 presents the Soviet personnel losses. The signed rank test p-value
shows that the difference between actual and estimated losses is zero. Compared with
other weapon types, the Soviet personnel losses have a better fit than the others. This is
the same result occurs with German personnel losses. This result suggests that the basic
QJM equation, which predicts the personnel losses, fits the battle well. Further
investigation is needed for the coefficients that are used in the computation of tank and
artillery casualties based upon the personnel casualty rates.
When the different data sets are compared, there is no strong evidence that any of
the models fits better than the others. However, overall, the ACUD data set fits slightly
better than the other data sets for German losses.
Figure 4.45 shows the Soviet tank loss comparison. It is clear that the model
overestimates the battle, which is also supported by the signed rank test. When the
Soviets attacked, the model highly overestimates battle casualties compared with the
other days. Even though the 8
th day was one of the heaviest days for tank battles, unlike
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the previous models, the QJM model overestimates this day. One of the reasons is that the
standard tank loss rate for the attacker is 12. Another reason might be the overwhelming
German combat power ratio over the Soviets. The Soviet combat power ratio is very
small, especially during the last days of the battle. For the Soviets, the ACUD data set fits
better than the other two data sets. All these results should be considered when comparing
QJM to the other models (ATLAS, RAND's SFS), as it is difficult to make direct
comparison.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis applies the Firepower score models to the data on the Battle of Kursk
of World War n, which is considered the greatest single tank battle in history. Three
Firepower score models were used. The first model is the ATLAS ground attrition model,
which is used in the TACWAR simulation [Ref. 24]. The second model is RAND's SFS
model, which was proposed in 1991 and is used in the JICM simulation [Ref. 25]. The
last model is the simplified QJM model, developed by Trevor Dupuy.
This thesis is the first published study that compares the firepower score approach
to calculate combat attrition with real two-sided, time-phased data. Three completely
different firepower score models were applied to three different data sets. Instead of
focusing only on one model and investigating it in detail, the applicability of the three
primary firepower score models to real data was investigated. In addition, some insight is
given about the attrition processes and other factors used in aggregated combat models.
Before presenting the conclusions of the study, we want to point out some of the
assumptions and limitations already mentioned in different parts of the study. These
assumptions and limitations follow.
• Although the data presented in the KOSAVE study is at the division level,
all divisions were aggregated into one sector, which represents the
southern front of the Battle of Kursk. The reason for this aggregation is the
lack of data about which division was engaged with which opposing
division. Thus, the data is highly aggregated.
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• The KOSAVE II [Ref. 14] report uses nine weapon groups. In order to
assign firepower score values to these weapon groups, RAND's proposed
score values were used. Tanks were selected as the base weapon category
and assigned a firepower score value of 100. Firepower score values are
not assigned to each specific weapon type. Rather, it is assumed that all
weapon types have the same score value in their weapon group. Therefore,
all tank types have the same firepower score value of 100. Other weapon
groups are assigned their firepower score values relative to RAND's score
proportions. In a following study, firepower score values can be assigned
to each specific weapon type rather than weapon groups. Furthermore,
another approach to assigning them could be located.
• As mentioned in detail in Chapter IV Section A.2.e, a linear regression
analysis was done to distribute the combat power casualty rate into
different weapon groups. In the analysis, the real data on the Battle of
Kursk was used. In advance of a battle, analysts would, of course, not
know this.
• On the Eastern Fronts of the two World Wars, the German relative combat
effectiveness superiority over the Russians was ranging between the
factors of 2.0 and 3.0. [Ref. 3:p. 43]. The relative combat effectiveness
value used in some models was chosen as 3 based on Turkes's research
[Ref. 11]. Similar to the relative combat effectiveness factor, some of the
factors used in different models are subjective and in follow on studies can
be investigated in detail.
• Towards the end of the battle, the battle lost its intensity. Although most of
the units on both sides were in a defensive position, in our models it is
assumed that one side is attacking the whole sector. This caused an
overestimation of the casualties in the models, especially, the models
where battle intensity is not implemented explicitly.
One of the hardest and time-consuming parts of this thesis was to organize the
data needed for the models used. Three different data sets were extracted from the data on
the Battle of Kursk. These data sets are All Combat Unit Data (ACUD), Contact Combat
Unit Data (CCUD) and Fighting Combat Unit Data (FCUD). This extraction is based
upon the combat status of the units—active, contact, and fighting. The reason for this
partitioning is to analyze the effects of the engagement status of the units over the
models. One of the interesting aspects of this battle is the engagement percentages of the
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forces. With an average of 97 percent of its heavy mechanized force on the front lines, the
Germans, unlike the Soviets, had no reserves to use [Ref. 14:p.9-4].
The firepower score values are used to aggregate the different assets of the forces.
The score values used in this thesis are computed relative to RAND's proposed firepower
score values, which are presented in RAND's note, Situational Force Scoring (SFS) [Ref.
7]. Also, the values that Bracken used in his study [Ref. 8] are also used to compare the
results with different weights. However, in his study, Bracken used only four groups of
weapons. For the rest of the weapon groups, which are already defined in this study;
RAND's values were again used. Thus, Bracken's weights were not completely used.
This fact should be considered when comparing the models.
The firepower scores are assigned to weapon groups instead of specific weapon
types. Thus, all the weapon types in a group have the same score. For instance, all tanks
have the same firepower score regardless of their type. This aggregation causes the loss of
information.
All three models are applied to the three different data sets. The result of each
model is given in the section in which the model is described. The results obtained from
the different models are intended to provide insight to the Battle of Kursk and aggregated
combat modeling in general. In order to present the results and compare them to the other
models, the R 2 values, given in Equation 4.6, are used. A greater R 2 value indicates a
better fit. It is possible to get a negative R 2 value, implying that the fitted model yields
worse results than using the average daily losses as an estimate.
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Also, the estimated versus real losses are presented in the figures for each weapon
group for both sides. These figures are very helpful in showing to show the pattern of the
fits visually. In order to test the hypothesis of whether or not the difference between
actual and estimated losses is the same, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used for all
figures.
When all the models in all the data sets are viewed in general, the following
conclusions are reached.
• Of all the models looked at, when combat power losses are considered, the
ATLAS model with the air sortie data fits best.
• Generally, the models overestimate the attacker's casualties during the
battle.
• Overall, all of the models fit better for the Germans than the Soviets. In his
study [Ref. 11], Turkes also found that his models fit better for the
Germans.
• In all of the models and for both sides, the FCUD data set gives the best
fit.
• One of the difficulties with aggregated combat attrition models that use
force ratio is the need to determine the attacking side. It is always not very
easy to determine the attacking side. In this study, the battle is highly
aggregated, and the data on the Southern Front of the Battle of Kursk is
used. This area consists of more than 50 divisions. As described in
Chapter HI, the attacking side is determined by the percentage of the units
that are attacking in a day. During the last days of the campaign, the
attacking units percentages are very low for both sides. However, the
attacking side is determined despite these low percentages. It is clearly
seen that in almost all models, during the last days of the battle, the battle
is overestimated.
• One way to overcome the problem described above might be to use the
battle intensity factor in the models. The SFS and the QJM models
implement this factor. However, one might argue the difficulty in
predicting the battle's intensity beforehand.
• Prior to a battle, it is difficult to determine factors such as intensity and
nationality factors.
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One of the problems with traditional force ratio models is that the loss
rates in each weapons category are the same as the combat power casualty
rate. For instance, if the combat casualty rate is 4 percent, then each
weapons category will take 4 percent losses. However, this does not match
either the historical facts or the results from the higher-resolution combat
models. In this thesis, the linear regression analysis is used to determine
how to allocate the combat power casualty rates to the different weapon
groups.
Including the air sorties in the models improved the quality of the fits for
all models. The air sortie data includes the bombing and ground attack
sorties for both the Germans and Soviets. The Germans generated more air
sorties than the Soviets did during the campaign.
Due to the general overestimation of the German casualties and the
underestimation of the Soviet casualties, anything that improves the force
ratio with respect to the Germans improves the quality of the fits. A better
fit could probably be obtained by adding factors for German efficiency
relative to the Soviets. Anything that added to German effectiveness or cut
Soviet effectiveness could improve the quality of the fits.
Partitioning the data according to the units' engagement status
significantly improves the quality of the fits. When all the models are
compared, the fits are better in the Fighting Combat Unit Data (FCUD)
than the ACUD and CCUD data. The FCUD data represents the combat
units directly engaged with the enemy.
Using different firepower scores, like Bracken's weights, does not give a
better fit except for the Soviet values in the CCUD data set, which is
slightly better. Much more work is needed to find the best firepower
scores, such as optimization of the score values, and sensitivity analysis.
The ATLAS ground attrition algorithm is very straightforward. One of the
concerns with the models is that the relative combat effectiveness of the
forces is not implemented explicitly. Despite the fact that on the Eastern
Fronts of the two World Wars the German relative combat effectiveness
superiority over the Russians ranged between the factors of 2.0 and 3.0.
[Ref. 3: p.43], in the ATLAS model they were assumed to be equal. This
does not make sense since the force ratio of the Germans is lower than 1 in
the ATLAS model. Thus, with this low force ratio, the Germans should
not attack the overwhelming Soviet forces.
The relative combat effectiveness is used in the SFS and the QJM models.
When this factor is taken into account, the German force ratio over the
Soviets increases, which gives a better explanation for their attacks.
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Although the SFS algorithm consists of a very simple calculation, it is
hard to define the multipliers, which are used in the calculations. As
mentioned in Chapter IV.B, some of the steps of the method are not clear.
In the SFS model, the weapon categories are mapped into the three
combined arms branches: armor, infantry, and artillery. At the end of the
calculations, the combat power casualty rates are distributed into these
three groups. This fact should be considered when comparing the SFS with
other models, which distributed casualties into nine weapon groups.
The best fit in the SFS model is observed in the German armor losses for
the ACUD data set and the German combat power losses for the FCUD
data set.
Also in the SFS model, the FLOT movement rates are computed by the
equations presented in RAND's notes. The best R 2 value for the estimated
movement rates, 0.45, is computed in the ACUD data set, which is a very
good fit for the combat models.
The FLOT movement rate is only computed in the SFS model. The
ATLAS model has also look up tables to compute the movement rates
according to the force ratio, terrain, and combat postures. However, in the
tables, the force ratio threshold is higher than the ones computed for this
battle. As mentioned above, the force ratio of the Germans in the ATLAS
model is very low. As a result, it was not possible to compute the FLOT
movement rates in the ATLAS model.
In the QJM model, the basic attrition calculation is for personnel losses.
Losses for other weapon types and materials are based on their historical
relationship to personnel losses. The R 2 value, 0.31, is the best fit for the
German personnel losses in the ACUD data of all models. This result
shows that the relationship between personnel losses and the other weapon
groups should be examined further.
Table 5.1 presents the R 2 values for all models for combat power and 10
weapon categories. The positive values are highlighted. For the SFS
model, personnel represents the infantry, armor represents the tank and
APC. Some models have negative R 2 values. This means one can have a
better estimate of attrition just by using the mean value instead of using
the model itself. In other words, it is better to use the mean value for
estimating the attrition instead of using the estimate given by the models.
Since the R 2 values are sensitive to a poor fit for one day, it is better to use
them with comparison figures, which presents the pattern of the fits.
In the SFS model, some R 2 values are negative and very low which
indicates very poor fits. Likewise, in the QJM model, especially for the
Soviet weapon groups, R 2 values are very low. The only positive values in
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the QJM model are observed in the German personnel and combat power
losses for the ACUD data set.
In the ATLAS models, the APC R 2 values are mostly positive, which
shows these models fit fairly well in the APC weapon group. The tank
R 2 values are fairly good in all of the models for both forces. No positive
value is seen for artillery, RKTL, MTR and AA weapon groups in all of
the models for both sides.
As mentioned in detail in Chapter EH, some discrepancies are observed for
the number of some weapons in the original database. These need to be
investigated in the future.
Model Data
Set










German -0.80 0.16 -0.63 -0.15 -0.11 -0.73 -0.43 -0.79 -0.41 -0.32 -0.01
Soviet -0.65 -0.19 -0.75 0.04 -0.91 -1.31 -1.72 -1.32 -1.69 -0.23 -0.71
CCUD
German -0.86 0.26 -0.70 -0.08 -0.13 -0.64 -0.59 -0.80 -0.42 -0.29 0.08
Soviet -0.33 -0.20 -0.45 0.08 -0.15 -0.78 -1.12 -0.92 -1.19 -0.26 -0.53
FCUD
German 0.16 0.54 -0.30 0.35 -0.13 0.05 -0.08 -0.79 0.00 -0.25 0.57






German -0.62 0.24 -0.42 -0.05 -0.08 -0.44 -0.39 -0.25 -0.30 -0.11 0.11
Soviet -0.24 0.03 -0.47 0.14 -0.42 -0.73 -0.82 -0.63 -0.75 -0.19 -0.23
CCUD
German -0.67 0.33 -0.46 0.01 -0.09 -0.39 -0.54 -0.25 -0.27 -0.09 0.21
Soviet -0.26 -0.15 -0.40 0.10 -0.13 -0.68 -1.01 -0.81 -1.07 -0.24 -0.44
FCUD
German 0.23 0.58 -0.15 0.40 -0.10 0.17 -0.06 -0.28 0.06 -0.06 0.62








German -0.76 0.18 -0.66 -0.15 -0.13 -0.69 -0.42 -0.81 -0.39 -0.26 -0.28
Soviet -0.50 -0.08 -0.62 0.09 -0.82 -1.06 -1.39 -1.03 -1.32 -0.20 -0.57
CCUD
German -0.81 0.28 -0.71 -0.04 -0.14 -0.64 -0.55 -0.86 -0.38 -0.32 -0.24
Soviet -0.21 -0.12 -0.38 0.10 -0.12 -0.64 -0.92 -0.74 -0.99 -0.23 -0.34
FCUD
German 0.16 0.53 -0.32 0.36 -0.14 0.03 -0.07 -0.85 0.00 -0.27 0.45








German -180.4 0.59 -131.5 - - - - - - - -13.45
Soviet -48.15 -0.31 -69.36 - - - - - - - -16.82
CCUD
German -32.47 0.066 -25.51 - - - - - - - -0.51
Soviet -48.85 -0.52 -35.38 - - - - - - - -17.76
FCUD
German -7.79 -0.28 -9.40 - - - - - - 0.38






German 0.31 -0.02 -1.74 -39.82 - -1.81 -0.13 -1.31 - -2.05 0.20
Soviet -27.72 -3.40 -119.5 -101.0 - -336 -33.93 -198 - -91 -2.49
CCUD
German -0.19 -0.29 -1.97 -23.52 - -1.82 -0.13 -1.85 - -2.17 -0.25
Soviet -15.80 -1.23 -87.98 -66.41 - -120 -16.34 -100 - -13 -1.07
FCUD
German -0.33 -0.48 -1.67 -11.54 - -1.48 -0.01 -1.69 - -1.96 -0.46
Soviet -14.61 -0.17 -87.48 -66.95 - -83.99 -15.06 -76.55 - -7.06 -0.76
Table 5.1. Results of All the Models Investigated in Chapter IV.
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• This analysis is based on observational census data of the Battle of Kursk ot
World War n, and may not generalize, since it is not a random sample of a
larger population. The outcome of a battle cannot be precisely determined
with the use of combat models. They might provide insights into future battles
between adversaries. Besides being used to gain insight into the battles, which
occurred in the past, they should help in making better decisions by enabling
the decision-maker to compare the different alternatives by using Vu. ms
combat model techniques [Ref. ll:p 145].
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The data used in this study contains only combat units. The support units and the
headquarters (HQ) above division level are not included. Data including the support units
and HQs can be examined in future analyses.
In this study, the weapon groups presented in the KOSAVE study were used [Ref.
14]. They can be grouped differently by aggregating or disaggregating the weapon groups.
The firepower score values used for aggregating the forces are subject to much
research. The best score values can be computed by an optimization that gives the best
R 2 value. Also, a sensitivity analysis can be made on the best firepower score values for
this battle. Score values were assigned to weapon groups. The database includes the
necessary data to consider every weapon type. Assigning different firepower score values
to each specific weapon type can be examined.
Partitioning the data according to the unit's engagement status can be applied to
the other models, i.e., not firepower score models. For instance, Turkes's study [Ref. 11]
can be revisited by using the three data sets presented in this thesis.
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As mentioned in Chapter HI, the Ardennes Campaign Simulation (ARCAS) Study
[Ref. 18] contains a database of Ardennes Campaign World War II 1944-1945. All the
models in this thesis can be applied to the Ardennes Campaign data set which is also two-
sided, time-phased (daily) and highly detailed.
Although the data presented in the KOSAVE study is at the division level, all of
the divisions are aggregated into a sector, which represents the southern front of the
Battle of Kursk. The reason for this aggregation is the lack of data about which division
was engaged with which opposing division. If someone can obtain this information from
the battle maps or the source of the data, the whole sector can be broken down into
multiple engagements. This higher resolution may improve the fits.
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